



YOUTH, EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION IN MOGADISHU, KISMAYO AND BAIDOA

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AS	Al Shabaab
BOA	Baidoa
CoC	Chamber of Commerce
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development
EA	Enumeration Area
EDF	Ethiopian Defence Forces
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member State
GBV	Gender-based violence
HIPS	Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IJA	Interim Juba Administration
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISWA	Interim South West Administration
IT	Information Technology
KII	Key Informant Interview
KIS	Kismayo
LNGO	Local non-governmental organization
MCOF	Migration Crisis Operational Framework
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
MOG	Mogadishu
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NGO	Non-governmental organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
PI	Paired Interviews
RC	Return Consortium
SDRF	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
SNA	Somali National Army
SSF	Somalia Stability Fund
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TIS	Transition Initiatives for Stabilization

UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VT	Vocational training
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research project aims to study the relationship between youth, employment and migration, looking at three main questions:

- 1) Who constitutes the youth workforce in Somalia, and are these young people satisfied with their situation?
- 2) How can the economic situation of dissatisfied youth be explained: is the source of the problem structural (not enough demand), or does it result from frictions within the labour market? Can youth create their own job opportunities through entrepreneurship?
- 3) Does dissatisfaction with occupation and level of income, along with difficulties to navigate the job market, alone explain irregular migration amongst youth?

THE YOUTH WORKFORCE

Nearly a third of the youth surveyed (33.7%) defined themselves as with a job, but they are usually in a situation of underemployment. These jobs are often part-time/occasional (35%) and nearly half of the employed youth (42%) have at least two simultaneous occupations. Uneducated youth, in particular IDPs, are the most affected by this issue. The average level of income for youth with an occupation is USD 190 per month.

14.3 per cent of the youth surveyed (or 30% of the active youth) reported to being unemployed, with a higher proportion of unemployed youth in Baidoa (24%) than in Kismayo (13%) and Mogadishu (6%). 72 per cent of the unemployed youth were actively looking for a job (*shaqodoon*), whereas the other 27 per cent reported feeling discouraged.

The majority of youth who have finished their studies are not satisfied with their current situation. They are discontent with their level of education (55%) and their current occupation (68%). They wish to be more educated and to have a trade (49%) or to be working with an NGO (23%). Many also expressed dissatisfaction with their salary, stating that they would need three times their current salary to meet all of their expenses – USD 520 per month on average. The majority of the youth feel that finding a more satisfactory job (80.5%) and earning a more satisfactory salary (76%) is possible in Somalia (as opposed to looking for it abroad).

THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET FOR YOUTH

The Somali economy has shown positive development over the last three years, since the end of Al Shabaab's (AS's) occupation of the main cities and the establishment of a government authority in Mogadishu. Companies have opened or reopened, and several private actors called this period a "revival". This economy is very much oriented toward the construction sector (building and rebuilding infrastructure) and retail (answering primary needs). Other basic services, such as electricity, waste management and water, are becoming more widespread.

Nearly all of the employers surveyed were interested in hiring more staff in the middle term, from private sector actors to local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) expecting more funding. Their optimism has not been translated into immediate waves of recruitments; it does not amount to an increase in labour opportunities in the immediate term, but it still bodes well for the future.

Interviews with private sector actors and youth revealed an increasing demand for educated staff, even for low-level jobs. In a competitive environment, Somalis with no education find themselves at a great disadvantage, and this tendency in turn effects a significant segment of the youth population that has not had the opportunity to go to school.

Small companies, which are the most common type of company in Somalia, do not advertise jobs and rely on relatives, close friends and clan elders to identify candidates. Insecurity and a general distrust of people from a different clan justify this practice in the eyes of company owners. Interviews with employers revealed very favourable perceptions of young applicants; but the preference for people from the same clan and the politicization of recruitments in the public sector appear to create bias in the selection process. Women experience additional challenges compared with their male counterparts when applying for a job.

A large majority of youth (67%) expressed interest in starting a company. Youth in Baidoa (76%) appear even more interested than in Kismayo (59%) and Mogadishu (67%), which may be due to higher unemployment in Baidoa and a more open environment for new businesses. Youth described lack of financial resources as the main obstacle to starting a company: nearly all of the young people (91%) interested in business stated that funding problems hamper their progress in the field.

DRIVERS OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION

All of the youth interviewed have heard of irregular migration (*tahreeb*), and nearly all of them know someone who has left Somalia without papers. As in many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, migrants aspire to better conditions, and they head to different destinations based on their financial situation and the objective of their journey. The typical aspiring migrant is a man or a woman usually under 25 who lives in Mogadishu. He or she is single, with an intermediary level of education. Notably, students, and not the unemployed, constituted the group to most readily express their interest in migrating.

Economic factors are the main reasons for youth to migrate, and respondents talked about the prospect of “finding a better job” as a primary motivation to leave (nearly half of the respondents with an interest in migrating), followed by the motivation to simply “find a job”. This confirms that unemployment is not always the main factor of departure, but that many aspiring migrants are simply motivated by better prospects and higher and more regular revenues than what they have now or can aspire to in Somalia.

The second most widespread push factor is insecurity, and this constitutes a specificity of Somalia compared to other sub-Saharan countries at peace. The lack of security may not be the primary driver of migration, but it often constitutes the tipping point: 27 per cent of the non-migrants who have thought about leaving reported that this is the one factor that could finally cause them to leave.

The price of irregular migration appears as the first obstacle to migration: there is a general agreement that leaving irregularly is expensive (90%). This means that the people who migrate irregularly are not the most vulnerable but that youth who have been able to save money or gathered support from their family in Somalia or abroad are. Many of the respondents also convened that irregular migration roads are too risky: 90 per cent of the interviewees reported that migrating is dangerous to very dangerous.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. CONTEXT

Somalia is characterized by a growing youth population, and nearly 70 per cent of the population is under 30.¹ Many do not have access to education opportunities or face challenges entering the labour market because of lack of skills, no linkage to job offers, limited capital for investment, or displacement-related vulnerabilities. This study focuses on urban youth, looking at three main cities in South Central: Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa.

1.1.1. MOGADISHU

Mogadishu is the capital of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and counts over 1.6 million inhabitants. During the civil war, Mogadishu came under the control of armed militias, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and AS, successively. In 2011, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ousted AS from the capital and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established. In 2012, the FGS was created, along with the main power institutions, the presidency and the Federal Parliament of Somalia. AS presence is localized in a few districts, and clan disputes remain a widespread issue, in particular with regards to land ownership. Security is a major concern in Mogadishu, with regular targeted killings, bombings, kidnappings and pervasive criminal violence.

1.1.2. KISMAYO

Kismayo is the capital of the Interim Juba Administration (IJA) and it counts around 210,000 residents.² During the civil war, Kismayo came under the authority of the ICU (2006), until the Battle of Ras Kamboni between the ICU and the forces of the TFG, Ethiopian forces and the African Union peacekeepers (2007). AS took over the city from pro-government groups in 2008 and kept it under their control until 2012. In 2012, the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM regained control over Kismayo, and leaders in Kismayo announced the creation of the IJA. The establishment of the interim administration served to drive out AS from a major stronghold and economic hub, but it has also opened the door to political power struggles between rival factions. In Kismayo, decades of violent shifts in control of the city by different clan movements and the void created by AS's departure caused deeply entrenched grievances and competition over power and access to strategic resources. These tensions have resurfaced in the form of clan-based conflict – mostly between various factions of the Darod (Majerteen, Ogaden and Marehan), but also the Hawiye and the marginalized Somali Bantu. Both the FGS and AS have been accused of exploiting these clan divisions by supporting or allying with rival opposition factions and actors in an attempt to weaken the IJA and expand their own authority in the territory. Today, Ahmed Mohamed Madobe is at the head of the IJA.

1.1.3. BAIDOA

Baidoa is the capital of the South West State and hosts around 160,000 people.³ It is at the centre of the first sorghum-producing region in Somalia, and many of the economic activities revolve around farming. The city has exponentially grown from 2006 to 2008, when it was the capital of the Government of Abdullahi Yusuf (2004–2008). In 2009, AS took over the district. It established a local administration and ran the city until 2012. During this time, the militant group banned humanitarian

¹ Somalia Human Development Report, 2012.

² UNFPA, 2014.

³ 264,000 for Baidoa district, according to UNDP (2005).

agencies on several occasions, and the region greatly suffered from the 2011 famine. In 2012, the Ethiopian Defense Forces (EDF) took over the city and a new government was set up. A convention was later signed between the FGS and representatives in Baidoa about the creation of a South West State. Two competing visions emerged: the advocates of the six-region state (SW6), led by Madowe Nuunow, and the supporters of the three-region state (SW3), under the direction of Mohamed Haji Abdinur. In early 2014, the FGS defused the tensions between the two groups, which merged to support a three-region state, constituted of Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle. The South West State of Somalia was finally established in November 2014 and the executive branch was created in March 2015.

1.1.4. IOM INITIATIVES IN SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is already active in South Central Somalia and has developed a comprehensive portfolio of activities catering to youth: livelihood, awareness campaigns about the risks of irregular migration, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former AS combatants. These programmes include:

- **Baidoa/Garbahaaray Vocational and Business Training (2013–2015):** IOM supported 206 youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs) or from the youth community, with vocational training (VT) in order to improve food security for households. The initiative also supported quick impact community projects, such as rehabilitation in IDP settlements. IOM also distributed cash grants and start-up kits and funded Intersos to train 200 youth from rural areas in the Baidoa district. In Garbaharray, IOM is supporting a six-month long business management training for 30 youth.
- **Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) (2010–2015):** IOM has been implementing TIS in Mogadishu, which includes the creation of job opportunities for youth, government/community dialogue events, construction of government buildings, community projects, capacity building at the governmental level and the organization of reconciliation and social cohesion forums.
- **Awareness Campaign about Irregular Migration (2014–2015):** IOM launched a one-year campaign across Somaliland and Somalia to raise awareness about the risks associated with irregular migration. The project relied on radio spots, short message services (SMS) and television spots, targeting primarily young men, but also the rest of the communities.
- **Support for Disengaged Combatants from AS (ongoing):** IOM has been involved in supporting the demobilization and reintegration of former AS combatants, through a DDR project implemented in Baidoa. IOM provides basic assistance to former fighters, but also VT and mediation services with the community of origin.

1.2. Objectives of the Study

This study is the result of the cooperation between IOM and Altai; it will inform the design of IOM youth programmes in South Central Somalia, in coherence and coordination with existing activities. IOM Somalia previously supported internship programmes and VT in Somaliland, Puntland, Baidoa and Garbahaaray; it now aims to assess whether opportunities for additional youth programmes exist in South Central – in particular in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa – and how to develop them so that they are relevant, efficient, effective, sustainable and impactful.

The overall objectives of the project are to study:

- 1) **Youth and livelihood opportunities:** Mapping youth livelihood opportunities in South Central;
- 2) **Youth and migration:** Mapping economic drivers of migration;
- 3) **Youth empowerment and employment programming:** Recommendations with regards to practical programming solutions tailored to the Peace Building and State Building targets, along with agency mandates.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. METHODOLOGY APPROACH

To answer the three objectives listed in 1.2. above, Altai structured its research around four key questions, and sub-questions, listed in the table below:

Table 1: Research Questions

Research questions: Youth, Employment and Migration
1) Youth Employment (Section 3.): Who is the youth workforce in Somalia, and are these young people satisfied with their situation?
<ul style="list-style-type: none">a) Youth Education (3.1.): What is the level of education for Somali youth, and what are the conditions of access to education?b) Youth Occupation (3.2.): What does youth employment look like?c) Unemployed Youth (3.3.): What is the profile of unemployed youth and why are they unemployed?d) Youth Aspirations (3.4.): Are youth satisfied with their current (economic) situation, and what do they aspire to?
2) Youth Access to Employment (Section 4.): How can youth dissatisfaction with their economic situation be explained? Is the source of the problem structural (skill mismatch) and/or does it result from frictions within the labour market (for example: hidden demands, externalities)?
<ul style="list-style-type: none">a) Labour Market Conditions (4.1.): How has the business environment developed in recent years since the departure of AS and the establishment of the FGS?b) Labour Demand and Skills Offered (4.2.): What is the relationship between skills needed and skills offered by youth in the job market? (Is there a mismatch?)c) Recruitment Process (4.3.): Are there specific barriers to the entry of youth in the job market? (Perceptions of young employees, recruitment pathways, importance of socio-cultural factors, regulatory frameworks.)d) Youth Entrepreneurship (4.4.): Can youth create their own labour market?
3) Youth Toward Irregular Migration (Section 5.): Does the problem associated with youth employment trigger irregular migration? If so, to what extent?
<ul style="list-style-type: none">a) Internal Movements (5.1.): What do the migration profiles of youth in South Central suggest? (Internal migrants, IDPs.)b) Socio-economic Drivers of Irregular Migration (5.2.): What economic drivers motivate irregular migrants, and what other factors trigger the departure?c) Pull Factors (5.3.): What are the pull factors and associated destinations?d) Discouraging Factors (5.4.): What are the arguments against irregular migration and how can they be strengthened to deter irregular migrants?
4) Unlocking Access to the Job Market (Section 6.): How can the level of youth satisfaction be increased, and how can the push factors of irregular migration be addressed?

2.2. RESEARCH MODULES

2.2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW

Throughout the research, the Altai team conducted a comprehensive review of the existing literature about youth, migration and employment. This review informed the background of the research and helped to frame the issues at stake. The research team looked in particular at studies about migration trends in sub-Saharan Africa, but also at analyses of specific points such as diaspora and the use of social media and migration.

Table 2: References, Migration

#	Title	Author	Date	Publication
1	“Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean Sea: Connecting the Dots”	Altai Consulting	2015	IOM
2	“Research on Youth, Employment and Migration in Somaliland and Puntland”	Samuel Hall	2015	IOM
3	“IOM Awareness Campaign: Enabling Informed Decision-making among Potential Migrants”	Samuel Hall	2015	IOM
4	“Taking Africa’s Irregular Migrants into Account: Trends, Challenges and Policy Options”	African Development Bank	2014	ADB
5	“Diaspora Return to Somalia: Perceptions and Implications”	Heritage Institute for Policy Studies	2014	HIPS
6	“Smuggled Futures: The Dangerous Path of the Migrant from Africa to Europe”	T. Reitano, L. Adal, M. Shaw	2014	The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime
7	“Internal Displacement in Somalia”	Jeff Drumtra	2014	Brookings Institute
8	“Social Media and Migration Research”	E. McGregor & M. Siegel	2013	Maastricht University/UNU; UNU-Merit Working Paper Series
9	“How Social Media Transform Migrant Networks and Facilitate Migration”	R. Dekker & G. Engbersen	2012	International Migration Institute/University of Oxford; Working Paper 64
10	“Smuggling of Migrants: A Global Review and Annotated Bibliography of Recent Publications”	UNODC	2011	UNODC
11	“Diaspora and Peacebuilding in Post-conflict Settings: Insights from Somaliland”		2011	Graduate Institute of Geneva
12	“In- or Outsiders? The Return of Qualified Diaspora Members and their Role in Rebuilding Post-Conflict Governance”		2011	The BSIS Journal of International Studies

13	“Migration for Development in the Horn of Africa: Health Expertise from the Somali Diaspora in Finland”	IOM	2009	IOM
14	“The Migration for Development in Africa Experience and Beyond”	N. Ndiaye, S. Melde, R. Ndiaye-Coïc	2009	IOM
15	“The Diaspora-Conflict-Peace-Nexus: A Literature Review”	Pirkkalainen, Päivi and Abdile, Mahdi	2009	Diaspeace
16	“What Role for Diaspora Expertise in Post-Conflict Reconstruction? Lessons from Afghanistan, the West Bank and Gaza”	The World Bank	2006	The World Bank
17	“The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study”	J. Gundel	2002	International Migration

The research team also collected and reviewed a series of papers about the labour market and economic conditions in Somalia. The desk review also included analyses of economic reconstruction in other post-conflict situations and challenges often associated with this type of dynamic.

Table 3: References, Labour Market

#	Title	Author	Date	Publication
1	“Level Playing Field Need to Expand Somalia’s Private Sector”	WB	2015	World Bank
2	“Somalia Economic Growth Strategy Assessment”	IBTCI	2014	USAID
3	“The Role of Somali Women in the Private Sector”	UNDP	2014	UNDP
4	“Market Opportunity Mapping in Somalia”	ILO	2014	ILO
5	“Keeping the Lifeline Open: Remittances and Markets in Somalia”	M. Orozco and J. Yansura	2013	Oxfam/ADESO/Inter-American Dialogue
6	“Youth Employment and Livelihood Survey on Skills and Market Opportunities”	ILO	2012	ILO
7	“Microfinance and Remittances”	K. Hulburt	2012	Shuraako
8	“Rebuilding War-torn States: Tomorrow’s Challenges for Post-conflict Reconstruction”	G. del Castillo	2012	ACMC Paper
9	“Lessons for Developing Countries from Experience with Technical and Vocational Education and Training”	C. Kingombe	2011	International Growth Centre
10	“The Economics of Peace: Five Rules for Effective Reconstruction”	G. del Castillo	2011	USIP
11	“Reconstruction Zones in Afghanistan and Haiti”	G. del Castillo	2011	USIP
12	“Economic Reconstruction of War-Torn Countries: The Role of International Financial Institutions”	G. del Castillo	2008	Seton Hall Law Review

13	“Youth Employment Promotion: A Review of ILO Work and the Lessons Learnt”	D. H. Freedman	2005	ILO
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The table below presents the main references that were used for the contextual analyses in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa. Other more general references were used to put the current situation in these three cities into perspective and to understand more in-depth historical and socio-cultural elements.

Table 4: References, Context Analysis (1)

#	Title	Author	Date	Publication
1	“District Profile: Mogadishu”	Altai	2015	IOM
2	“District Profiles: Baidoa, Kismayo”	Altai/UNCHR	2015	UNHCR
3	“Conflict Analysis: Somalia”	Ken Menkhaus	2014	UNSOM
4	“Scoping Study on the Cultural Sector of Somalia”	UNESCO	2013	UNESCO
5	“The State of Higher Education in Somalia”	Heritage Institute	2013	HIPS
6	“Somalia Human Development Report: Empowering Youth for Peace and Development”	UNDP	2012	UNDP
7	“Mogadishu Rising?”	Saferworld	2012	Saferworld
8	Understanding Somalia and Somaliland	L. Lewis	2011	UK: C. Hurst and Co.
9	“Gender Profile for Somalia”	J. Gardner	2007	European Commission

Throughout the research, Altai closely followed news and editorials published in local newspapers. The international staff systematically read English publications from Somalia, while the Somali consultants collected and translated articles from Somali sources. The objective was to analyse news coverage and newspapers’ editorial policies to understand recent developments, how issues associated with youth were perceived, and what type of solutions were advocated.

Table 5: References, Context Analysis (2)

#	Resources
1	AMISOM News
2	Hiraan
3	Irin News
4	Raxanreeb
5	Relief Web

2.2.2. YOUTH SURVEY

Quantitative Survey

Altai conducted a survey with 1,200 respondents under 30 across the three cities (see Table 6 below).

The interviews looked into:

- **Respondent profile:** Gender, age, family situation, financial situation, level of education, region of origin, previous moves.
- **Current occupation:** Main occupation, level of education and desired level of education, obstacles to education, link between level of education and position on the job market, professional status, level of revenues, ability to meet family’s needs and coping mechanisms employed, most important skills in current occupation (for unemployed respondents), time without a source of income, obstacles to finding a job.
- **Knowledge and perceptions of the job market:** How youth look for a job, most effective ways to apply for a position in a local business or public administration, main strengths and weaknesses as a job applicant, job opportunities in the city.
- **Unlocking access to the job market:** What would help to make young people more attractive on the job market, interest in starting a business, obstacles to starting a business.
- **Experience of migration/displacement:** Previous experiences, previous push factors, choice of destination, gains from migration, level of support received at destination.
- **Knowledge and awareness about irregular migration:** How easy, expensive and/or dangerous it is to go abroad without the required documents; easiest, cheapest and most dangerous countries to reach.
- **Perceptions of irregular migration:** Existing push and pull factors, obstacles to irregular migration (journey and at final destination), alternatives to going abroad.
- **Future:** Perceptions of economic, security, social and political conditions in the next six months; trust in opportunities in Somalia.

Table 6: Youth Survey, Sampling

Sampling	
Gender	
▪ Men	▪ 49%
▪ Women	▪ 51%
Location	
▪ Mogadishu	▪ 400
▪ Kismayo	▪ 400
▪ Baidoa	▪ 400
Age	
▪ 14–19	▪ 29%
▪ 20–25	▪ 43%
▪ 26–30	▪ 28%

Table 7: Sampling Methodology

Sampling Methodology
Mogadishu: In the eight districts/EAs selected (Wadajir, Hodan, Hamarweyne, Hamr Jabjab, Warta Nabad, Waberi, Abdiaziz and Holwadag), five starting points were defined. 10 interviews were conducted per starting point.

Kismayo: In each of the five villages/EAs, eight starting points were defined. 10 interviews were conducted per starting point.

Baidoa: In each of the eight districts/EAs, five starting points were defined. 10 interviews were conducted per starting point.

At the beginning of each day, the field supervisor shared with the enumerators where they needed to go and monitored that they were working in the correct EA (phone verification and GPS coordinates were recorded at the beginning of each interview). During the day, the supervisor conducted random checks on enumerators, verified that they were selecting respondents according to the simple random walk methodology chosen for the survey and controlled the administration of the questionnaire. The data was updated daily on the Survey CTO server and Altai verified the location of the interviews, the duration of the interviews and the consistency of the answers to flag potential anomalies.

Paired Interviews

24 paired interviews (PIs) were conducted across the three locations, eight per location. PIs were favoured over focus group discussions because they allow participants to engage more intimately in a conversation, especially regarding such private topics. In each city, Altai/Tusmo interviewed eight men and eight women, eight internal migrants, eight IDPs, eight non-migrants and eight returnees. The PIs looked into:

- **Respondent profile:** Level of education, occupation, previous migration experience, previous push factors, perceptions of migration experience.
- **Work experience:** Level of employment, level of satisfaction with current occupation, aspirations for the future.
- **Knowledge and perceptions of the job market:** How respondents look for a job; last experience looking for a job; perceived needed skills on the job market; difficulties experienced in the job market due to migration profile or gender; existing opportunities for young people.
- **Unlocking access to the job market:** Ideas to facilitate youth integration into the job market.
- **Knowledge, awareness and perceptions of irregular migration:** Perceptions of irregular migration; relationships with people who have left Somalia irregularly; understanding the root causes of migration; knowledge of migration roads; perceptions of dangers associated with irregular migration.
- **Future:** Perceptions of security, economic, social and political conditions and how these may evolve in the next years.

2.2.3. EMPLOYER INTERVIEWS

Interviews with **104 employers** were conducted across the three locations: 74 private companies, 15 LNGOs, 15 public offices (see Annex for the full list). These discussions looked into:

- **Background of the company/organization/public department:** When it was created; objectives upon establishment and how the structure has evolved since then; how many people work there; geographical scope.
- **Employment of young people:** How many young people work in the company/organization; what are their main assets and specific skills as employees; what are their main weaknesses.
- **Required/needed skills:** What are the skills needed in the company/organization; which skills are needed and which are difficult to find.

- **Employment methods and recruitment process:** How does the company/organization typically advertise positions; according to what criteria are new staff hired; what does the recruitment process look like.
- **Sector environment:** What does the public/private/aid sector look like; what has changed in recent years; how do respondents perceive development in the near future.
- **Opportunities to unlock youth access to employment:** What ideas do stakeholders have about how to facilitate youth access to the job market.
- **Future:** Perceptions of security, economic, social and political conditions and how these may evolve in the next years.

2.2.4. KEY INFORMANTS

Local Level

Altai and Tusmo conducted a total of **38 KIs with local stakeholders**, including universities, youth organizations, Chambers of Commerce and business committees, job seeking services, government representatives, banks and private foundations (see Table 8 below). Tusmo field researchers pre-identified these informants and Altai/Tusmo developed specific guidelines for each interviewee:

- When talking to university representatives, Tusmo researchers focused on services available at these schools, recent changes in the education sector – in particular with regards to the demand – along with how the universities connected their students with the job market.
- Tusmo consultants also interviewed youth organizations and asked them about the main social, economic and security issues faced by the youth, existing programmes to address these problems and opportunities to further engage with young Somalis.
- Interviews with Chambers of Commerce/business organizations focused on the state of the business sector, skills needed and how to facilitate the integration of the youth into the job market.
- Meeting with job seeking service agencies, Tusmo researchers collected information about the nature of the services, achievements and challenges experienced, along with the state of the business sector and obstacles to youth employment.
- Tusmo also met with a number of government representatives to gather data about national and state policies and conducted discussions surrounding their further developments.

Table 8: KIs at the Local Level

Organizations	Locations
Universities	
1 Somalia University	Mogadishu
2 Mogadishu University	Mogadishu
3 SIU University	Mogadishu
4 SIMAD University	Mogadishu
5 Benadir University	Mogadishu
6 Kismayo University	Kismayo
7 Technical Institute University	Kismayo
8 Technical Institute Research and Development	Kismayo

9	Lower Juba University	Kismayo
10	Sheikh Mohamud Mo'alim Nuur Sharia University	Kismayo
11	Bay University	Baidoa
12	University of Ganaane	Baidoa
13	University of Southern Somalia	Baidoa
14	University of Upper Juba	Baidoa
Youth Organizations		
1	SORDO	Mogadishu
2	SOYDAN	Mogadishu
3	Centre for Youth and Democracy	Mogadishu
4	IRDA	Kismayo
5	Lower Juba Youth Union Organization	Kismayo
6	Jubaland Youth Union Organization	Kismayo
7	Baidoa Sports Club	Baidoa
8	Baidoa Youth Club	Baidoa
9	Baidoa Youth Women	Baidoa
10	KANAVA Youth Development	Baidoa
11	South West Youth Club	Baidoa
12	Somali Youth Volunteer Group Association	Nairobi
Chambers of Commerce, Business Organizations		
1	Mogadishu Chamber of Commerce	Mogadishu
2	Jubaland Chamber of Commerce	Kismayo
3	Business Committee	Kismayo
Job Seeking Services		
1	Shaqodoon	Mogadishu
2	Fursad	Mogadishu
Government Stakeholders		
1	FGS Ministry of Youth	Mogadishu
2	FGS Ministry of Higher Education	Mogadishu
3	FGS Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development	Mogadishu
4	FGS Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	Mogadishu
5	Civil Servant Commission at the IJA Ministry of Labour	Kismayo

Banks		
1	Dahabshiil	Mogadishu
Foundations		
1	Foundation Hormuud	Mogadishu

International Level

In Nairobi and Mogadishu, Altai met with international organizations, implementers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to talk about existing programmes, best practices and lessons learnt from initiatives targeting Somali youth.

Table 9: KIIIs at the International Level

International Stakeholders		
International Organizations/Bilateral Agencies		
1	IOM	
International Implementers		
1	DAI (PIMS)	
International NGOs		
1	ACTED	
2	CONCERN	
3	International Rescue Committee (IRC)	
4	InterSOS	
5	Islamic Relief	
6	REACH	
7	Save the Children	
8	Shuraako	
9	World Vision	

2.3. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

2.3.1. CHALLENGES

The research team faced four main challenges during the fieldwork:

- 1) **Security and access:** Insecurity and threats from AS remained the main concern throughout the research. Field coordinators systematically conducted security checks with local sources, prior and during the survey, to ensure conditions allowed for the deployment of the teams. On several occasions, interviews had to be postponed due to security incidents in Baidoa and Mogadishu and political events in Kismayo.
- 2) **Sensitivity of some components of the research:** Particularly related to clan affiliations and the job market. Heads of companies sometimes refused to answer questions about the impact of political and security conditions on their business activities. Stakeholders in Baidoa

sometimes felt suspicious and refused to meet with our team or answer questions about the situation in Baidoa.

2.3.2. LIMITATIONS

In terms of data, the limitations are as follows:

- 1) The youth survey is **representative of the urban youth** in three main cities in South Central (Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa); the sample does not cover other larger cities in the region (Belet Weyne, Dhusamareb, for instance) and rural areas where over 60 per cent of the Somalis live.
- 2) Companies interviewed are not strictly representative of the business environment, but were **purposely selected** to offer the most accurate picture of the private sector. In each city, Altai worked with Tusmo to collect the list of firms registered with the local Chamber of Commerce. However, the lists collected were not up-to-date/comprehensive and/or the teams were not able to collect such lists, and so Altai/Tusmo proceeded differently to select the target companies. In each city, Altai/Tusmo developed together a list of sectors appearing as promising/likely to hire youth or women/less dynamic sectors. For each of these sectors, Tusmo field coordinators identified three to four companies and Altai randomly selected which firms were interviewed.

3. THE YOUTH WORKFORCE

KEY FINDINGS

- A quarter of the youth (14–30) surveyed have no education; the majority of them are women and live in Baidoa and Kismayo. Their lack of education puts them at a disadvantage in the job market.
 - The demand for higher education is on the rise among youth, and the number of private higher education institutes has greatly increased. The sector is, however, unregulated; the quality of the services delivered is not monitored. Additionally, the sector does not satisfy either the demand for technical or specialized curricula (for example, medicine, engineering).
 - Nearly a third of the youth surveyed (33.7%) defined themselves as with a job; while this appears as a high employment rate for the active youth, they are usually in a situation of underemployment.
 - The youth surveyed were mainly involved in the service sector (17.9% as, for example, cooks, waiters, hairdressers), in craftsmanship (12.8% as, for example, carpenters, plumbers) and in elementary occupations (12.1% as, for example, street vendors, shoe cleaners). These jobs are often part-time/occasional (35%) and nearly half of employed youth (42%) have at least two simultaneous occupations.
 - The average level of income is USD 190 per month, and 35 per cent of employed youth live on less than USD 2 a day. Half of the youth surveyed (50%) cannot provide for their family, especially women (58%). The young people who cannot meet their needs receive support from their family in Somalia (35%) or abroad (21%).
 - 14.3 per cent of the youth surveyed reported to be unemployed, with a higher proportion of unemployed youth in Baidoa (24%) than in Kismayo (13%) and Mogadishu (6%). Youth who reported being unemployed were also more likely to be uneducated (38%). Among the active youth (youth who are not students/housewives), the unemployment rate was at 30 per cent.
 - The majority of the youth who have finished their studies are not satisfied with their current situation. They are dissatisfied with their level of education (55%) and their current occupation (68%). They wish to be more educated and to have an activity in trade (49%) or to be working with an NGO (23%).
 - Many also expressed their dissatisfaction with their salary, stating that they would need three times their current salary to meet all of their expenses – USD 520 a month on average. The level of ideal salary ranges from USD 230 in Baidoa to USD 1,530 a month in Mogadishu.
 - The majority of the youth feel that finding a more satisfactory job (80.5%) and earning a more satisfactory salary (76%) is possible in Somalia (as opposed to looking for it abroad).
-

This section aims to answer the question: **Who constitute the youth workforce in Somalia, and are these young people satisfied with their situation?** To answer these questions, this section builds on the youth survey, interviews with stakeholders and employers, and it looks into the state of the education sector – from primary school to higher education – by analysing the demand for education and the existing educational offerings, with a focus on higher education (3.1). The focus then shifts to an analysis of the situation of young people (ages 14 to 30) on the job market, those with employment (3.2) and those without (3.3). The section concludes with an assessment of the youth's satisfaction with their current economic conditions and what they aspire to for their futures (3.4).

3.1. YOUTH EDUCATION

Education opportunities in Somalia are limited and the illiteracy rate is one of the highest in the world (62.2%).⁴ However, the sector has undergone **rapid development since 2012**, after the liberation of several strategic cities⁵ from AS control and the establishment of the FGS. Education is a **key priority of the reconstruction process**, for the government but also for donors,⁶ and it comes under the PSG 5, “Revenue and Services”, of the Somali Compact.⁷

Findings show that a notable proportion of youth (24%) have no education, especially those in the 26–30 age bracket as well as young women who often discontinue their studies post-marriage. However, data indicates **an increasing demand for both elementary and higher education** and a growth in the number of education institutes. The sector is almost completely private and unregulated, and the quality of teaching **does not meet the high demands of the youth**.

3.1.1. YOUTH WITH NO EDUCATION

An important proportion of the urban youth surveyed (24%) had no education at all, a figure likely to be lower than the national average, given that the sample was made of young people interviewed in three major cities where access to education is more widespread. Those in the 26–30 age bracket were twice as likely to answer “No education” (33%), compared to the younger 18–26 age group (17%). This suggests an **improvement in access to learning**, especially since the departure of AS⁸ and the return to more peaceful conditions in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa.

Access to education is also gendered, and uneducated female respondents (32%) were twice as many as male interviewees (15%). This results from cultural obstacles to female education (a woman’s role is understood to be within the home) and the practice of early marriage in Somalia.⁹ Out of the young women without an education, 53 per cent were housewives. Box 1 below provides more details about impediments to girls’ education.

Uneducated youth were more numerous in Baidoa (30%) and Kismayo (27%) than in Mogadishu (14%), which may be due to an earlier liberation from AS control (2011) in the latter city. Moreover, because of earlier and easier access, aid organizations have been more active in supporting schooling in Mogadishu and economic conditions are also generally thought to be better in the capital,¹⁰ which alleviates some of the financial obstacles to education there.

Finally, **vulnerable groups like IDPs** face more difficulties in accessing education. There are often no schools in, or nearby, the settlements, and displaced families can rarely afford to pay for the education of their children. An IDP interviewed in Kismayo reported, for instance, that her husband makes between USD 4 and USD 6 a day for a family of five children, when school costs USD 15 a month.

⁴ Index Mundi, 2014, ref: <http://bit.ly/1RMexch>

⁵ Mogadishu and Belet Weyne in 2011, Baidoa and Kismayo in 2012.

⁶ Programmes such as Go-2-School Initiative, ref: <http://uni.cf/1R3BeHU>

⁷ Ref: <http://bit.ly/1QA7YZf>

⁸ Schools remained open in areas under AS control, but the education system greatly deteriorated. Infrastructure was not maintained, the central government was not paying teachers, many left the country and aid organizations were not always able to intervene (embargo on aid imposed by AS). Parents also worried about sending their children to school due to the AS practice of kidnapping students and enrolling them with AS by force.

⁹ UNFPA reports that: “Somalia has one of the highest child marriage prevalence rates in the world. On average, almost one out of two girls will be married before their 18th birthday. In 2006, about 45 per cent of the women aged 20–24 were married/in union before age 18.” Ref: <http://bit.ly/1KUZVUC>

¹⁰ Interviews with youth and university stakeholders in the three cities.

Box 1: Obstacles to Female Education

As illustrated in Figure 1 below, 60 per cent of the young women interviewed stated that they do not/did not face obstacles to study. It is an encouragingly high proportion due to the fact that the study was undertaken in urban areas; barriers to women's education are likely to be higher at the national level.¹¹ As for the 30 per cent who face/faced difficulties, the main hurdles were: "I have to take care of the house" (25%) and "My husband doesn't let me study" (24%). Another common obstacle is that families under economic constraints systematically favour the education of young men over that of their daughters.

Figure 1: Specific Obstacles to Study





Figure 2: Nature of the Obstacles



3.1.2. YOUTH WITH PRIMARY/SECONDARY EDUCATION

41 per cent of the youth interviewed had completed primary or secondary school,¹² which means that they are literate and have basic skills in mathematics.¹³ While stakeholders observe a high demand for education, **many issues remain with the quality of the services offered.** There is no harmonized system, no national curriculum and no agreement on the language of teaching (cf. Box 2 below). Most of the schools are private, fee-based and under no regulations. UNICEF Somalia reports that the low quality of teaching in the country has translated into high numbers of students who drop out, are held back or who do not graduate.¹⁴

¹¹ 66 per cent of the female students reported that they did not face obstacles to their education.

¹² According to UNICEF, out of 1.7 million primary school-age children, 710,860 are in school (42%). Of those, 36 per cent are girls (ref: <http://uni.cf/1LceD8C>). The figures presented in this report are slightly higher and result from a bias of the sample towards urban youth.

¹³ Primary and secondary education may imply different definitions in Somalia. Indeed, two systems coexist: the main system, inherited from the Siad Barre era, includes four years of elementary classes, four years of intermediate and four years of secondary school, and the system imported from Arab countries, which includes six years of elementary classes, three years of intermediate and three years of secondary school.


¹⁴ UNICEF Somalia, ref: <http://uni.cf/1LceD8C>

Box 2: Primary Education in Mogadishu¹⁵

The Mogadishu-based think tank Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) recently released a report about the conditions of schooling in the capital. It found that schools in Mogadishu do not rely on the same curriculum (for example, number of years per cycle, subjects taught), and that there are at least 10 systems in use (from Kenya, India, Pakistan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Yemen). English and Somali are the preferred languages of teaching, but some institutions also deliver courses in Arabic, and new schools funded by Turkey teach in Turkish. Quality of teaching is generally poor and most teachers do not have to demonstrate preliminary qualifications. These dynamics imply that youth with primary/secondary level education are likely to be less educated than one would expect.

As represented in Figure 3 below, only a small proportion of interviewees (2%) said that religious education was their highest level of education. This does not mean that other respondents have not taken religious classes in addition to their other studies, and it is likely that the majority of the sample has attended Islamic courses at some point at the local mosque. Traditionally, students who *only* attend religious schools come from families with modest means who cannot afford school fees.

Figure 3: Highest Level of Education



3.1.3. HIGHER EDUCATION

Security improvements in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, along with better economic conditions, have contributed to a **higher demand for higher education**: a university degree is increasingly perceived as a worthy investment. Private higher education institutions are fast growing, but the quality of their teaching remains poor; they only offer basic curricula and they do not answer the youth's pressing demands to **become more employable**.

Student Population

According to representatives from higher education institutes and universities in the three cities, **the general population of students is on the increase**. The survey found that students in higher education are usually men (56%), younger than 25 (92%)¹⁶ and single (87.2%). The most educated

¹⁵ Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, "Educational challenges in Post-Transitional Somalia", 2015, ref: <http://bit.ly/1RmHviA>

¹⁶ 51 per cent are younger than 19, and are either entering university or finishing their secondary education degree. Out of the 399 students surveyed, 27 per cent have a high school degree, 19 per cent have a license, and only 24 per cent have primary level education.

respondents were more represented in the capital: 34 per cent of the respondents **in Mogadishu** held a license (or bachelor's degree), against 6 per cent in Kismayo and Baidoa.

The greater number of students in Mogadishu suggests a more pronounced interest for higher education in the capital, but can also be attributed to the fact that higher education offerings in Mogadishu are more diversified and reputed to be of better quality. Students from main cities in South Central move to Mogadishu to attend university, while students from districts neighbouring Kismayo and Baidoa tend to move to regional capitals for university.¹⁷

Higher Education Offer

Many new institutes and universities have opened in Somalia since 2011, and all of them are private – except for the Somali National University (located in Mogadishu and free of charge). The size of these establishments varies, from small institutes in Baidoa and Kismayo, with an average of 100 students, to larger universities in Mogadishu, like Benadir that welcomes over 5,000 people. These institutions rarely carry an entrance exam; on the contrary, they seek to attract as many students as possible.¹⁸ This means that the education level of the student population can be very heterogenous and some may be not prepared enough for higher studies.

Programmes offered

The higher education sector is not regulated by national laws, and universities do not follow a harmonized programme. There is no control to approve the curricula and ensure that schools meet a standard, and no government authority monitors the qualifications of the teaching staff. Youth organizations and other relevant associations interviewed reported that the services offered were not good, especially in Kismayo and Baidoa.

“They use old and outdated curricula, which will not help the future of the students.”

– Youth organization, Mog.

The table below presents the main topics offered in higher education establishments across the three cities: **Nearly all of the universities visited taught business** administration, or business management, along with a health programme and a diploma in social sciences.¹⁹ Of note, the same title may refer to different curricula in two different institutions, in the absence of programmes defined at the national level (cf. Table 11 below regarding degrees in business management). Many diplomas are short-term, six months to one or two years, but an increasing number of institutes offer longer courses (three to five years).

Table 10: Programmes Offered in Higher Education Institutes²⁰

Programmes	Mogadishu (5)	Kismayo (5)	Baidoa (4)
Business administration (accounting, management)	5	4	4
Health (public health, nutrition, nursing)	5	3	4
Social sciences	4	4	3

¹⁷ For instance, Kismayo University welcomes students from all districts in Jubaland.

¹⁸ More details about the university offers in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa can be found in Annex.

¹⁹ Some universities also reported the development of curricula in foreign languages – Chinese in Kismayo, for instance. While little developed and with limited appeal, these programmes could contribute to the development of niches for young graduates.

²⁰ Based on interviews conducted with 14 universities/higher education institutes in Mogadishu (5), Kismayo (5) and Baidoa (4). See list of universities interviewed in 2.2.4.

IT	5	2	1
Islamic studies	3	2	2
Engineering	5	-	-
Education	2	1	1
Agriculture	1	-	2
Law	3	-	-
Veterinary	1	-	-

Main Selection Criteria: Job Opportunities after Graduation

According to university representatives, students select their field of study in great part **based on the job opportunities they are likely to get upon graduation**. Higher education institutes report that the **most popular programmes are in the medical sciences**, or related topics (midwives, nurses, etc.), because they guarantee positions with NGOs or the government. These courses are usually the most expensive and so they are only accessible to upper class families, or students with relatives abroad who can pay their fees.

The second most popular diploma is in business administration, a field that provides basic information about the management of a private company. Table 11 below describes the topics that are covered by a business administration degree across different institutions, as well as the fees charged and the duration of study. The table demonstrates that while most institutions offer a degree in business administration, the contents of the course vary greatly across different institutions. In Kismayo, a representative from a university noted a rapid increase in business administration graduates and warned that they risked becoming less attractive in the job market due to a potential oversupply.

Table 11: Bachelor of Business Administration

	Price	Duration	# students	Topics	Diploma
Simad University (Mogadishu)	USD 370 (sem.)	4 years	500+	Business Admin. Procurement Accounting Banking/Finance	Bachelor's degree
Plasma University (Mogadishu)	USD 300 (sem.)	3.5 years	200+	HR management Science of Management Marketing Islamic finance Logistics and Supply Management Accounting	Diploma and Bachelor's
Lower Juba University	USD 375 (sem.)	2 years	25+	Business Admin. HR Management Project Management Starting in Economy English Literature	Diploma

University of Southern Somalia (Baidoa)	USD 35 per month	2 to 4 years	50+	Financial Accounting Business Communication Mathematics Starting in Economy	Diploma (2 years), Bachelor's (4 years)
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IT or computer science programmes are also proving popular and have quickly developed in the last years. They usually include classes in multimedia design, software development, Internet services and computer maintenance, and higher education institutes normally lend computers to the students. The sector appears the least developed in Baidoa, and one representative from Bay University found that students neglected it because they doubted they could get a job afterwards (as the sector is still limited there).

The least popular programmes are also the ones that offer the scarcer opportunities. **Students avoid degrees in education and social sciences** because they are perceived to lead to low-level or poorly paid jobs (teacher, for instance). Islamic studies, while proposed in nearly all the universities, is also unpopular for lack of job prospects.

Demand for more advanced and/or technical programmes

A general complaint from employers, students and even representatives from universities is that **higher education institutes lack advanced and/or technical curricula**. This constitutes a common challenge in post-conflict environments, where previous higher education institutions have been destroyed during wartime. Engineering, medical programmes and advanced computer courses are in high demand, along with diplomas in agriculture and fisheries, although not many are offered. A representative of the FGS Ministry of Fishery lamented the gap in skilled staff: “There are only a few old experts, but the young generations did not get the chance to study marine sciences after the collapse of the Somali Government.” Although some universities already provide diplomas in IT or medical studies, the quality of the teaching is usually poor.

“There is nowhere for agriculture engineers to study in Somalia.”

– FGS Ministry of Agriculture

Table 12: Demand for New Fields of Study²¹

	Mogadishu	Kismayo	Baidoa
Civil engineering	+++	+++	+++
Medical studies	+++	+++	+++
Agriculture	++	+++	+++
Fisheries biology and management	+++	+++	
Law	++	++	++
Veterinary	++	+++	+++
IT/Computer science (advanced)	++	++	++
Energy studies	++	+	+

²¹ Based on interviews conducted with 14 stakeholders from universities/HE institutes in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, along with students and 107 employers. “+++” means “in very high demand”; “++” stands for “in high demand”; and “+” implies “in demand.”

The main difficulty for universities and higher education institutes is that they **lack skilled professors** to lead advanced programmes. As reported by several heads of higher education establishments, the expert staff either left the country during the war or are too old now and not up to date with the latest developments in the field. This gap in experienced teachers constitutes a major hurdle for the development of such institutions (see Box 3 below); and some universities have recently tried to hire professors from the Somali diaspora in order to fill the gap.²²

Box 3: Professors in Somali Higher Education Institutes²³

Across the 14 universities surveyed, the majority of professors hold a bachelor's degree, and very few have a PhD. Higher education institutes hire few female teachers, and women systematically represent less than 10 per cent of the professors. Salaries for teachers range between USD 300 and USD 700 a month, which is not attractive for a senior expert, especially if she/he has studied abroad. Compensation can be more competitive in Mogadishu where professors with a PhD are paid up to USD 2,000 a month.²⁴

Tuition Fees

Nearly all the higher education institutes and universities are private, and fee-based. Fees are often monthly, but can also apply to a full degree. The price depends on the city (more expensive in Mogadishu), the quality of the teaching (more expensive in Mogadishu), and the nature of the programme (medical and IT diplomas tend to be more expensive). For instance, programmes in social science in a Kismayo higher education institute would range from USD 15 to USD 25 a month, against USD 890 a semester for a medical programme in Mogadishu.

“Frankly speaking, there are many young people who remain on the streets and don't have enough money to pay the fees.”

– HE Institute, Kismayo

This dimension creates an **economic divide amongst students**, and only the ones with well-off families, in Somalia or abroad, can afford to pay for their studies. University representatives also note that the main reason for dropouts is financial: throughout the term, the family of a student would be in need and he/she would have to get a full-time job to make a living.

All 14 higher education institutes and universities reported offering small scholarships to 20 to 30 students per year, usually to the most outstanding students and those with the greatest financial needs. For instance, Kismayo University grants free admission for the best student in every secondary school in Kismayo at the end of each year and a few international donors or organizations also support students in need (for example, Mogadishu University has a scholarship programme sponsored by private investors from the Gulf).

Box 4: Benadir University

Benadir University was created in 2002 as a medical school to train doctors in Somalia. Since 2013, the university has 10 faculties and offers diplomas in medicine, computer science and IT, education, engineering, agriculture, Sharia law, veterinary science, health science, dentistry and economics

²² MIDA, implemented by IOM, is supporting these initiatives.

²³ Based on interviews conducted with 14 stakeholders from universities/HE institutes in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa.

²⁴ Some of these positions are also funded by the programme Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA), which ensures a higher compensation for experienced professors from the Somali diaspora.

and management. As of 2015, it welcomes over 5,000 students. Prices of the programme range between USD 290 per semester (Faculty of Sharia Law) and USD 890 (Faculty of Medicine and Surgery). 150 professors work at Benadir, including 35 women. 100 of them have a master's degree and 45 hold a PhD.

The most popular programmes are in: Medical sciences, nursing and health, due to the pressing need in the sector; computer science and IT, because of the demand in the private sector; business administration, in need with the development of the business sector.

Links to the Job Market

None of the universities or institutions interviewed had any plans to connect students to the labour market, in the form of internships, job forums or career counselling. This limited linkage results both from the inexperience of these institutions, almost all recently established and new to the sector, but also from the fragmentation of the private sector, which makes it difficult to identify large companies to which students could apply.

However, several university representatives noted that informal placement schemes were not uncommon, and teachers would sometimes help students connect with a public office or a firm through their personal connections. Some universities, like the University of Kismayo, have been involved in VT workshops for international organizations, like Mercy Corps, but these initiatives usually take place outside of the regular education framework offered to registered students (more details on vocation training in 6.2.2).

3.2. YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

Nearly a third of the youth surveyed (33.7%) defined themselves as “with a job”, but many are in a situation of **underemployment**.²⁵ Their jobs are often part-time, and nearly half of them have at least two simultaneous occupations. The majority also reported incomes inferior to what they need to meet their needs.

3.2.1. OCCUPATIONS

Employed youth were typically men (58.9%), older than 20 (88.7%)²⁶ and who had never moved from their original location (71.3%). A quarter of them were uneducated (23.8%), but **the majority had basic education** (51.5% from primary to secondary education), and the last quarter (24%) held a university degree. Employed youth were often married with children (42.1%), but a third of them were single (33.8%). Their households counted on average six people, including three children.

Main Occupation


As illustrated in Figure 4 below, employed youth were mainly involved in **low-level occupations** (48.1%): services (17.9%), craftsmanship (12.8%), elementary occupations (12.1%) and positions such

²⁵ Mainly with regards to the number of hours worked. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines “underemployment” as: “The underutilization of the productive capacity of the employed population. The concept is integrated in the conceptual framework for measuring the labour force and is based on similar criteria to those used to define employment and unemployment. The underemployed population is a subcategory of the employed population and is identified by comparing their current employment situation with an ‘alternative’ employment situation that they are willing and available to carry out: simply put, persons in underemployment are all those who worked or had a job during the reference week but were willing and available to work ‘more adequately’”. (More at: <http://bit.ly/1Lz6wGI>)

²⁶ 10.9 per cent were between 14 and 19; 43 per cent were between 20 and 25 and 45; 7 per cent were between 26 and 30.


as drivers or machine operators (5.3%). Most of the youth who worked in these fields were uneducated,²⁷ or had a low education level. Only a small segment, the most educated ones, worked as professionals (13%) or in high-level positions (5.5%).²⁸

Figure 4: Main Occupation



Occupations were also found to be gendered, with the near majority of women (44%) either involved in elementary occupations (19.2%) or basic service delivery (24.9%). Young women often worked as cleaners in houses or hotels, in a beauty salon, or sold basic commodities at the local market. Educated women were likely to be teachers or health workers (for example, nurses or housewives). By comparison, young men were more represented among technicians (10.1%), professionals (16.6%) and high-level occupations (7.2%). While uneducated men only had access to casual work, the ones with a degree were able to work as teachers, doctors or engineers (even though their numbers were limited).

Figure 5: Occupation per Gender




²⁷ Out of 112 respondents with no education, 31 worked in services, 28 in an elementary occupation, 15 as craftsmen and 11 as plant operators.

²⁸ Out of 20 respondents with a master's degree, 8 worked as professionals and 8 held a high-level position (senior government officials, CEO of a company).

The figure below presents the spread of occupations per location. Services were equally represented in the three cities, but craftsmanship was much more common in Baidoa (22.5%) than in Mogadishu (5.5%). Youth with an elementary occupation were also better represented in Kismayo (16%) and Baidoa (14.6%) than in the capital (6.1%). By comparison, **the highest level positions were concentrated in Mogadishu** (12.9% for senior government officials and managers of a small or a large company; 17.2% for professionals such as teachers or engineers), which is coherent with a local economy with more added value activities and a larger pool of educated staff.

Figure 6: Occupation per Location



Secondary Occupations

Nearly half of the youth with an occupation (42%) also had a second occupation, and this situation did not only apply to workers with a low-level job.²⁹ For the educated youth, this second job was often in a field they were interested in but that was not profitable enough. For instance, a young man interviewed in Mogadishu started a logistics company but worked for research organizations in his spare time because this guaranteed him additional revenues and contributed to his understanding of a field in which he wanted to work. For uneducated workers, finding a second job often meant working additional hours in another low-paid position. Women who worked as cleaners in hotels in the morning would look for other cleaning jobs in their neighbourhoods in the afternoon (for example, washing clothes, cleaning houses).

3.2.2. EMPLOYMENT STATUSES

The majority of the sample (63%) reported to be working full-time, but the rest of the interviewees defined themselves as part-time or occasional workers and experienced **underemployment**. As illustrated in Figure 7 below, 38 per cent of employed youth worked less than nine months a year, and 25 per cent were active less than half the year. The average number of days worked in a month for employed youth was 14, from 12 days in Mogadishu and Baidoa, against 18 days in Kismayo. Women

²⁹ For instance: 8 out of the 26 youth with a high-level occupation had another occupation. 16 out of the 57 with an elementary occupation had a second job. These second jobs were of the same nature as the first jobs.

typically worked fewer months in a year than men: 8.6 months for employed women, against 9.1 months for employed men, on average. IDPs were the most likely to have an irregular activity as a result of their unstable living conditions (life in a settlement) and, often, the lack of permanent job opportunities (due to limited skills and education).

Figure 7: Professional Status





Figure 8: Number of Months Worked in a Year



Professionals and youth in high-level positions were the most likely to work full-time;³⁰ whereas **unskilled workers** were the main group to suffer from underemployment –they were often required to seek a job on a daily basis. This situation was found to be particularly widespread in **the construction sector**, where workers moved from one construction site to the next. An unskilled worker in Kismayo explained: “Construction companies are the main ones to hire the uneducated young people [...]. It can finish within 10 to 15 days, and you may wait to get another construction job for a month.”

“Out of seven days, you may work three days. [...] I cannot pay my bills every day. Some days, my children stay at home and we’re hungry.”

– IDP man, working in construction sector, Kismayo

3.2.3. LEVELS OF INCOME

The average income for employed youth was around **USD 190 a month**.³¹ 35 per cent lived under the poverty line (USD 2 a day) and 25 per cent were in a state of extreme poverty (under USD 1.25 a day).³² As illustrated in Table 13 below, major discrepancies existed in terms of gender, location and age. Nearly all women in the sample (93.3%) made less than USD 50 a week, whereas a higher proportion of male employees earned between USD 51 and USD 200 a week (14.4%, against 3.7% of women). Salaries were higher in Mogadishu where nearly 10 per cent made more than USD 400 a week, against 1 per cent in Kismayo and none in Baidoa. None of the respondents aged between 14 and 19 made more than USD 50 a week, whereas nearly 20 per cent of the 26–30 age bracket did.

³⁰ 52 out of 61 professionals worked full-time; 21 out of 26 in high-level jobs worked full-time.


³¹ USD 54 a week on average.

³² As defined by the World Bank.

Table 13: Levels of Income (per month)

Gaps in level of income	
Gender	
Women	USD 135
Men	USD 230
Location	
Mogadishu	USD 360
Kismayo	USD 150
Baidoa	USD 120
Age	
14–19	USD 75
20–25	USD 185
26–30	USD 230

Figure 9: Levels of Revenue over the Last Seven Days



Respondents with the highest level of education systematically proved to have the highest salary,³³ whereas nearly all the respondents with no education or religious education made less than USD 50 a week.³⁴ Interviewees with a job in elementary fields, craftsmanship, as plant and machine operators, technicians and in the service sector earned less than USD 50 a week.³⁵ By comparison, government officials, managers of companies and professionals (for example, teachers, engineers) made USD 90 a week on average, and up to USD 330 for the manager of a company.

Income and Expenses


Half of employed youth (50%) cannot provide for their family, and women (58%) experienced more difficulties than men (44%) in doing so. Regardless of the size of the household, respondents were not comfortable with their income level, especially the ones with the lowest wages. 57 per cent of employed youth who made less than USD 50 a week could not provide for their family. As reported by a male IDP, married with children, in Kismayo: “If I give an example of my monthly bills [*food, housing, water, clothes*], I need to pay almost USD 250 a month. In addition, we have to pay for education, health services and the other needs of family. So you see, I may work around 14 days a month and make USD 15 a day; but, at the end of the month, I still miss around USD 250.”

³³ Out of 61 employed youth with a license, 24 made more than USD 50 a week. Out of the 10 employed youth with a master’s degree, 5 earned more than USD 201 a week.

³⁴ Out of 79 employed youth with no education, 71 earned less than USD 50 a week. All the youth with a religious education made less than USD 50 weekly.


³⁵ Elementary occupations: 47 out of 48; armed forces: all 11; craftsmen: 50 out of 54; services: 60 out of 66; technicians: 26 out of 31.

Figure 10: Providing for Family Needs



Young workers involved in elementary occupations and craftsmanship faced the most difficulties in terms of meeting their household needs. On the contrary, nearly none of the sampled men and women working as professionals (teachers, engineers, etc.) or holding a high-level position in government or a private company reported difficulties in supporting their household.


Figure 11: Ability to Meet Needs – Per Occupation



Filling the Gap Between Income and Expenses

Youth who cannot meet their needs often received support **from other family members in Somalia (35%) or abroad (21%)**. The results presented in Figure 12 indicate high levels of family solidarity that often move beyond just immediate family. These networks have developed and strengthened throughout the civil war, which created the need for social safety nets. The steady support of family members living outside of Somalia suggested that they were perceived as a reliable resource, which contributed to the positive image of migration.

Figure 12: Coping Mechanisms when Revenues are Insufficient



Respondents expressed concern that such a situation was **not sustainable**. A young woman in Kismayo reported, for instance: “I know getting support from my parents is not viable. They can lack money to send me. And they will also die one day. I am supposed to take care of myself.”

“Most in my family are like me, every body is surviving. And the community, you may accept a gift from one person but you cannot go to him every day.”

– IDP Man, Kismayo

3.3. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Youth unemployment is perceived as a major issue by both youth and employers. According to a UNDP estimate,³⁶ 67 per cent of Somali youth are unemployed (including both men and women), and 74 per cent of female youth in Somalia are without a job.³⁷ Employers, stakeholders and youth who were interviewed during this study in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa estimated youth unemployment to be closer to 80 per cent or 90 per cent. Within our sample of youth in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, only 14.3 per cent stated that they were currently unemployed, or 30 per cent of the active youth interviewed (see Box 5 below).

Box 5: Gap Between Employed/Unemployed

This figure (14.3%) is much lower than the UNDP 2012 estimate (67%), and this discrepancy results from a number of factors: 1) The survey was conducted in three cities, among the most developed in South Central, and not representative of the dynamic at the national level (UNDP report also covers Somaliland and Puntland); 2) Economic development has occurred since 2012; the reconstruction dynamic is documented in 4.1; 3) Likely increase in underemployment (3.2) compared with strict unemployment; and 4) Accounting for the informal sector, since the definition of “unemployed” in this report is subjective (how the interviewees define themselves).

³⁶ UNDP Somalia, Human Development Report, 2012.


³⁷ Not accounting for the informal sector.

3.3.1. UNEMPLOYED YOUTH

Unemployed youth tend to be single men (53.8% of unemployed youth were men and 53.8% were also single), between the ages of 20 and 25 (43.9%).³⁸ The number of youth that reported being unemployed were more numerous in **Baidoa** (24%) than Kismayo (13%) and Mogadishu (6%). This suggests fewer job opportunities and a slower pace of economic development in Baidoa than in the other two cities (see 4.1 about Labour Market Conditions and 5.1.2 about Internal Migrations).

The average duration of unemployment was between 12 months to six years. The figure below shows that over 50 per cent of unemployed youth are without a source of income for more than six months, but 79 per cent find a job in less than a year. These findings support the idea that the market is not closed to young applicants and that **longer term unemployment is rare**.


Figure 13: Number of Months without a Source of Income



Coping Mechanisms for Unemployed Youth

As was the case with employed youth in need, the majority of unemployed youth (60%) are also receiving **support from family in Somalia** and nearly a third (27%) are receiving help from family abroad (see Figure 14 below). Most continue to live with their family but respondents lamented that this situation was not sustainable because their relatives might not be able to continue supporting them. An unemployed young man in Kismayo shared: “There is only one brother who is helping me and I am very much grateful to him. But the fact is, this cannot go on for so long, because my brother [*who lives abroad*] may get very busy with his own family when he gets married. He may also get sick or be forced to return to Somalia. His financial support could stop at anytime.”

Figure 14: Coping Mechanisms – Unemployed Youth



³⁸ Percentages here were calculated based on the unemployed group.

3.3.2. REASONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT

72 per cent of unemployed youth interviewed were actively looking for a job (*shaqodoon*), whereas a quarter stated that they were not. As shown in Figure 16, the lack of interest in searching for a job appeared to be due to discouragement after having searched for work for a prolonged period of time without any results. For example, a young returnee from Kenya, interviewed in Kismayo, explained that he was “just waiting at home.” He had studied at Kenyatta University in Nairobi and used to be a teacher there, but after returning to Somalia he was unable to find a job and eventually stopped looking for work. Six of the respondents also explained that they were not looking for work anymore because they were now trying to start their own company (see 4.4 about Youth Entrepreneurship). In the case of unemployed women who were not looking for a job, it was mainly due to household chores and responsibilities preventing them from being able to do so.

Figure 15: Looking for a Job






Figure 16: Why Not?



When asked about the main obstacles to finding a job, unemployed youth (especially those in Baidoa) insisted that it was down to **external factors** – lack of job opportunities (54%),³⁹ lack of information about jobs (31%) – as opposed to factors related to the possible weakness of their profile – lack of experience (20%), lack of skills (16%). These perceptions reflect universal dissatisfaction with the job market amongst youth with different levels of education and suggest that youth see themselves as victims of a difficult situation. This is presented in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Obstacles to Finding a Job



³⁹ Out of the 44 respondents who answered “lack of job opportunities”, 39 were in Baidoa.

Employers, like youth, agree on the dire consequences of unemployment for the economy but also with regards to security. Employers reported that **unemployment benefits AS**, because they can recruit young fighters more easily, with promises of a regular salary.⁴⁰

Several also noted that young men who were waiting on street corners all day for a job aroused the suspicion of the security forces who regularly harassed them. Finally, youth and employers lamented that unemployment encouraged drug addiction and the development of criminal networks surrounding this business.

“I strongly feel that the problem of unemployment may create new security problems in Kismayo and Somalia, because the unemployed youth could easily join al Shabaab or a rival group.”

– Company owner, Kismayo

3.3.3. HOUSEWIVES

Housewives constitute **an important segment of the youth population** (13.1% in the sample), but they are often neglected in programming. The majority of housewives are under 25 (69.6%), and a quarter (26.6%) are under 19 (which implies that they married before the age of 18). While not unemployed, they were inactive. They usually had no education (66%), no skills and no experience in looking for a job. They also constitute a very vulnerable group: if their husband requests a divorce, gets sick or dies, they are without any resources, while often with several children to support.

It is the cultural norm that women stay at home and take care of the house,⁴¹ but some reported an interest in working to increase the revenue of the household. Out of the 158 housewives interviewed, 119 declared that they were **not satisfied with their current occupation**. For instance, an IDP woman in Kismayo explained that her husband did not make enough money for them to afford decent living conditions. She said: “I am not satisfied with my lack of employment. I would be more interested in starting a business. My ideal job is to sell clothes.”

3.4. YOUTH ASPIRATIONS

The majority of youth who have finished their studies (66%) were not satisfied with their current situation. They wished to be more educated and to have an activity in trade (49%) or to be working with an NGO (23%). Many also expressed dissatisfaction with their salary, stating that **they would need three times their current salary to meet all of their expenses on average**. The majority felt that finding a more satisfactory job and earning a more satisfactory salary would be **possible in Somalia** (as opposed to needing to migrate abroad).

Students had slightly different ambitions: many wished to graduate with a master’s degree (42%) and the near majority aspired to work **in the aid sector** (48%). This trend reveals high confidence in the reconstruction process and international support, but also the limited appeal of the Somali government-led economic and development reform programmes.


⁴⁰ See more on the economic motives for joining AS in: Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia”, ISS, Sept. 2014.

⁴¹ J. Gardner, “Somalia Gender Profile”, 2007.

3.4.1. ASPIRATIONS OF STUDENTS


As demonstrated in Figure 18, close to half of the students interviewed (42%) wished to obtain a **master's degree**, which shows how much young Somalis now value a university diploma. Students in Mogadishu were the most ambitious: 65 per cent aimed to get a master's degree, against 15 per cent in Kismayo⁴² and 29 per cent in Baidoa. As explained by a young student in Mogadishu, this results from increased competition among university graduates, in particular in the capital: "There are so many bachelor's graduates now that the employers prefer candidates with a master's degree." Of note, there were **no significant differences between the aspirations of young women and men**,⁴³ which suggests that female students feel less pressure to stay at home than their counterparts with no education (see 3.1.1).

Figure 18: Desired Diploma



As illustrated in Figure 19 below, the ideal job for half of students (48%) surveyed was to **work for an NGO**, and 17 per cent wanted to start a company. NGOs are particularly appealing for youth because they are seen as guaranteeing a good salary, which is paid on time – compared to the government that often delays the payment of salaries. Students interviewed also praised NGOs for operating transparently and contributing to the professional development of their staff, through training sessions, seminars and workshops (sometimes abroad).

Figure 19: Job after Graduation



⁴² In Kismayo, the majority (58%) wished to graduate with a bachelor's/license.

⁴³ 40 per cent of female students aimed to graduate with a master's, against 43 per cent of male students. 33 per cent wanted to achieve a bachelor's/license against 34 per cent of the young men.

Women were slightly more likely (20%) than men to be interested in **entrepreneurship** (12%), whereas male respondents (51%) were more likely to aspire toward a job with an NGO.⁴⁴ Female workers often have to manage their job and their household, and having their own company allows them to manage their own schedule. Interviews with young women in Kismayo also indicated that women felt that men were more likely to be hired by NGOs. A youth organization in Kismayo reported, for instance: “Women feel ignored. They say, we hear about gender balance but we don’t see the practical application of the principle.” Such perceptions contrasted with reports from aid organizations that they deploy specific efforts to recruit female candidates.


3.4.2. ASPIRATIONS OF THE YOUTH WORKFORCE

Level of Education

The majority of the youth workforce was **not satisfied with their level of education (55%)**, especially the ones with no education or the lowest education diploma. Youth with a bachelor’s/license or a master’s were overwhelmingly more satisfied with their situation, whereas youth with no education were generally not content: 100 out of 110 youth with a bachelor’s/license or a master’s were satisfied with their level of education; whereas 114 out of 150 youth with no education were not pleased.

Unemployed youth (70%) were most likely to voice their discontent with their studies, especially in Mogadishu (95.7%) where it appeared that education matters more for finding a job.⁴⁵ Nearly half of employed youth (48%) were not pleased with their education either. Respondents in Kismayo (40%) and Baidoa (39%) were less likely to be satisfied with their degree.⁴⁶ The most dissatisfied respondents worked as craftsmen, tradesmen or had an elementary occupation (for example, street vendors and shoe cleaners). As illustrated in Figure 20 below, employed youth had similar ambitions to students, with 40 per cent **aspiring to obtain a bachelor’s/license or a master’s**. Nonetheless, another quarter would be satisfied with only **a basic educational degree (37%)**, which should be within reach of targeted programming efforts of the FGS and aid organizations.

Figure 20: Desired Level of Education – Employed Youth



⁴⁴ 38 per cent of the female respondents wanted to work for an aid organization.

⁴⁵ Against Kismayo (76.9%) and Baidoa (59.4%).

⁴⁶ Against 69 per cent of satisfaction among employed youth in Mogadishu.

Satisfaction with Occupation

68 per cent of the youth workforce reported their dissatisfaction with their current occupation.

As illustrated in Figure 21 below, women (72.9%) were more likely to express discontent with their current conditions. Figure 22 shows that these perceptions were also geographically localized, with three times as many satisfied youth in Mogadishu (45.2%) as in Baidoa (14.6%). 65 per cent of those surveyed who made less than USD 50 a week were not satisfied by their occupation, which suggests that satisfaction with one's job is linked to one's level of salary.⁴⁷

Figure 21: Satisfaction with Current Occupation – Per Gender





Figure 22: Satisfaction with Current Occupation – Per Location



As shown in Figure 23, when asked what would be their ideal occupation, almost half of the respondents (49%) indicated that they would want to work **in trade/retail**, and a quarter (23%) voiced their **interest in an NGO position**. These results compare interestingly with the aspirations expressed by students: the interviewees with the highest education levels also wished to work for an NGO,⁴⁸ whereas the great majority of uneducated respondents preferred to be involved in trade.⁴⁹ This confirms the idea that the aid sector attracts the most highly educated candidates. As previously

⁴⁷ Against 10 dissatisfied respondents out of the 39 surveyed/who answered this question and made more than USD 50 a week.

⁴⁸ 35 out of 86 interviewees with a bachelor's/license or a master's. Only five were interested in trade.

⁴⁹ 127 out of 211 interviewees with no education. Of the 211, only 13 wanted to work for an NGO.


noted, young women were more interested in trade than working for an NGO, whereas men expressed the inverse wish.⁵⁰

Figure 23: What Kind of Job Would Make You Satisfied Enough to Stop Looking for Better Opportunities?



The figure below shows that respondents in Baidoa were very interested in trade (59.6%) and a position in an NGO (29.6%), whereas the aspirations of youth in Mogadishu were more diversified – which could reflect the more developed capital city economy. Of note, the highest interest in entrepreneurship (15.2%) and a career with the FGS (10.1%) was found in Mogadishu.

Figure 24: Ideal Occupation – Per Location



Satisfactory Level of Income

The majority of youth interviewed in the three cities noted that their ideal level of income ranged between **USD 150 and USD 400 a month**. The majority of interviewees, making less than USD 250 a


⁵⁰ 52.7 per cent of the female respondents answered “trade” as an occupation that would satisfy them, against 43.2 per cent of the male interviewees. 20.4 per cent of the women voiced an interest in a job for an NGO, against 27.1 per cent of the men.

month, aspired to salaries of around USD 400. These figures were not unrealistic given the average wage in Somalia, but still three times as much as the average salary reported by employed youth (3.2.3).

Table 14: Satisfactory Level of Income

Satisfactory level of income	
Total average	USD 520
Men	USD 622
Women	USD 435
Mogadishu	USD 1,530
Kismayo	USD 445
Baidoa	USD 230
14-29	USD 281
20-25	USD 546
26-30	USD 618

Figure 25: Satisfactory Level of Income



Looking for jobs with better remuneration appears to be common among people interviewed, as a journalist in Kismayo explained: “I’m happy with my current job, but I would prefer a position with a better salary. I could maybe start my own business.” Educated youth typically had salary expectations of over USD 600 a month, whereas uneducated youth would be satisfied with an income of between USD 100 and USD 300.⁵¹ These results confirm that being employed is not necessarily a source of satisfaction and that employed youth may have a job they do not want to perform with a salary they are not satisfied with, but that they stay in the role because they cannot find another position.

⁵¹ 49 out of the 69 interviewees with a bachelor’s/license or a master’s aspired to a salary over USD 600 a month. 135 out of the 168 respondents with no education reported salary expectations of below USD 400.

Opportunities in Somalia

The great majority of respondents believed that they could **find a satisfactory job (80.5%) and salary (76%) in Somalia**. While it does not mean that they are uninterested in looking for opportunities abroad, it still shows that they felt they could realistically fulfill their aspirations in their country. Of note, respondents in **Mogadishu** (39.4%) were five times more likely to be skeptical about the possibility of finding their ideal job in Somalia than respondents in Kismayo (8.5%). They also expressed more doubts (36%) about the chance of achieving their salary target in the country. This may be due to higher ambitions from respondents in the capital and a greater disconnect between these dreams and actual developments in Mogadishu.

Figure 26: Finding Ideal Job in Somalia – Per Location





Figure 27: Satisfactory Income in Somalia – Per Location



4. THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET FOR YOUTH

KEY FINDINGS

- The Somali economy has shown positive developments over the last three years since the end of AS's occupation of the main cities in South Central and the establishment of government authority in Mogadishu. Public services are limited but growing, and there is an increasing need for skilled civil servants.
 - Interviews with employers revealed very favourable perceptions of young applicants. Employers reported no prejudice against young staff; on the contrary, they praised young employees for being motivated and keen to learn.
 - Interviews with private sector actors and youth revealed an increasing demand for educated staff, even for low-level jobs. The most pressing needs for uneducated staff were reported in the hospitality, craftsmanship and tailoring sectors, followed by mechanics, electricians/plumbers and drivers.
 - Most employers look for educated staff with simple skills such as business management (accounting in particular), English and basic IT knowledge. There is a critical gap of specialized skills on the job market (for example, in health and engineering), which is not uncommon in post-conflict situations and will require a long-term investment in the education sector to be addressed. In the short term, members of the diaspora could fill the gap.
 - Many of the job offers are not broadly advertised because employers favour the selection of relatives or clan members over the most skilled candidates. This system is likely to prevail as long as security conditions do not improve further. This excludes candidates that do not have the right connections or who come from minority clans.
 - The development of new sectors of activity and new companies could partly resolve the discrepancy between a high labour offer and a labour demand that is presently limited. A majority of young people reported an interest in starting a business, but most claimed that they lacked the initial capital required for such a venture.
-

This section seeks to answer the question: **How can the dissatisfaction of youth with their economic situation be explained: Is the source of the problem structural (not enough job demand), or does it result from frictions within the labour market? Can youth create their own job offers through entrepreneurship?** Based on interviews with youth, employers and stakeholders, this section first analyses the conditions of the labour market and its changes in the last few years (4.1). It looks into the skills needed and maps fields where there is a pending demand (4.2). Going further, it presents an in-depth review of how employers conduct recruitment, from the initial posting of job offers to the selection of new staff members (4.3). Finally, the section explores opportunities for and obstacles to youth entrepreneurship (4.4).

4.1. LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS

The Somali economy has shown **positive developments** over the last three years, since the end of AS's occupation of the main cities in South Central and the establishment of a government authority in Mogadishu. Companies have opened or reopened, and several private actors called this period a "**revival**". Constraints on development are, of course, numerous, and job creation has not been as high as it needed to be in order to offer comfortable and stable positions to the youth workforce. It remains that the majority of stakeholders, in the private, public and aid sectors, are optimistic and share a hope that the situation will continue to improve.

4.1.1. PRIVATE SECTOR

“Economic Reconstruction”⁵²

The departure of AS from the main urban centres in South Central, relatively stable security conditions and the establishment of the FGS have paved the way for the economic reconstruction of the country after over 20 years of civil war. A representative of the Business Committee in Kismayo⁵³ summarized: “Currently, we are benefiting from the stability.” This economy is very much oriented toward the **construction sector** (to build and rebuild infrastructure) and **retail** (to answer primary needs).⁵⁴ Other basic services such as electricity, waste management and water are becoming more widespread. A growing number of private actors offer education and health services, especially in Mogadishu. Given the absence of enforced regulations, informal trade of, for example, qat and charcoal – despite being banned – remain widespread.

Nearly all of the business stakeholders (68) interviewed shared their **optimism** with recent economic developments and noted the rise of new entrepreneurs. Out of the 77 companies interviewed, 33 were established after 2011, and they all found that the present environment was positive for investment (see Figures 28 and 29 below). Some of the companies that had closed under AS, like Hotel Kismayo in Kismayo, have reopened. The large majority of firms also reported that they would be willing to hire staff in the near future: while this may not actually happen, it still reflects a positive outlook on future economic development. It also means that expectations are very high for the reconstruction process and, if they are not met, it could lead to disillusionment among entrepreneurs.

Figure 28: Date of Creation of Companies Interviewed





Figure 29: Assessment of Business Development by Companies Interviewed



Only a few large Somali companies operate in Somalia (see Table 15 below). The private sector is comprised mainly of **Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)**, a situation commonly found in post-conflict conditions. As shown in Figure 30 below, only 22 of the 77 companies surveyed employed more than 30 people. While the sample is not strictly representative and is likely to entail a

⁵² G. del Castillo (2012) calls the period that follows a war the “economic reconstruction”, or “economy of peace”, or “economic transition”, defined as “not only the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and services ravaged during war and the demining of fields and roads so that productive activity can begin, but also the modernization or creation of a basic institutional and policy framework. This is essential for the successful reintegration of former combatants and other crisis-affected groups into the economy, which is the basis for national reconciliation”.

⁵³ Business organization in Kismayo.


⁵⁴ Of note, these sectors are not representative of the Somali economy as a whole (and the dominance of the agriculture sector) because the 77 interviews were conducted in three urban centres.

bias for larger and formally established companies,⁵⁵ it still provides an interesting snapshot of the sector.

Table 15: Largest Somali Companies⁵⁶

Somali companies
Benadir Gate Construction
Dahabshil Bank (finance)
Al Buruj Construction
Hormuud (telco.)
Horseed Media (media)
Nationlink (telco.)
Salaam Bank (finance)
Somtel (telco.)
Somali Energy Company
Telcom (telco.)
Waberi Group (retail)

Figure 30: Size of the Companies Interviewed



The Somali economy is largely **unregulated** and so there are few legal hurdles to business development. In Mogadishu, companies register with the Benadir Regional Administration for USD 300, an easy procedure that does not involve any other specific requirements. The establishment of a legal framework is slow, but the creation of CoC (see Box 7 below) should contribute to its improvement. In the longer term, and if enforced transparently,⁵⁷ such a legal framework should ensure legal security for companies, which does not seem to constitute a major problem now but could hamper foreign investment in the future.

Box 7: Establishment of Chambers of Commerce

CoCs have been established in the three cities over the last three years. Mogadishu is the largest one, created in 2012. It counts over 1,000 registered companies and defines its role as to support the development and protection of Somali firms. Its objectives also include lobbying for the improvement of the local business environment and promoting Somali products abroad. The Mogadishu CoC organizes local exhibitions and it also promotes Somali companies at international fairs, like at the Universal Exhibition in Milan (2015). While these three CoCs are still in their early days and their management would need to be coordinated, their single establishment is a sign of economic dynamism and willingness from the business community to get organized.

⁵⁵ Cf. Methodology (2.2.3). Tasked with developing a list of companies in each city, the Tusmo researchers were more likely to think of larger/well-established/formal companies and not small market stalls. This implies that our sample is not fully representative of the informal sector and micro companies (even though 2 out of the 77 companies surveyed had only 1 employee).

⁵⁶ This list is not exhaustive but refers to the companies mentioned the most frequently during interviews with businesses.

⁵⁷ Establishing a legal framework for private companies, in countries with high levels of corruption, may actually be detrimental for doing business because it creates additional hurdles and pushes private actors into bribing government officials.

Investment, although limited, is increasing. Somali diaspora are the main contributors, followed by businessmen from China, Turkey and the Gulf. Foreigners have expressed their interest in opportunities in Somalia and have already invested in some large-scale projects – for example, Turkish companies have invested in the Mogadishu port and international airport.⁵⁸

Mogadishu

Mogadishu demonstrates **the highest dynamism**. As the capital, it attracts most of the investment and benefits from the presence of international aid agencies and the diaspora. Construction is one of the most active sectors in the capital, with new hotel complexes, the development of government offices and the rehabilitation of buildings previously destroyed during the civil war. Retail is another attractive market and more shopping centres are being established, especially in busy areas such as Maka Almurkama street.⁵⁹ Financial institutions have grown, including the establishment of Premier Bank, IBS Bank, TAB Bank, and Salama Bank. Finally, the business community reports an important drive in the health sector, with both domestic and foreign investors opening large private hospitals.⁶⁰ The table below makes a ranking of the key sectors of the Somali economy, based on qualitative data: “+++” refers to a very dynamic sector, “++” means dynamic sector, and “+” means relatively dynamic field.

Table 16: Most Dynamic Sectors, Mogadishu⁶¹

Most dynamic sectors, Mogadishu	
Construction	+++
Retail (food, clothes, hardware)	+++
Trade	+++
Telecommunications (including ISPs)	++
Logistics	++
Hotels/restaurants	++
Bank/money transfers	++
Oil stations	+
Electricity	+
Water	+
Education	+
Health	+

⁵⁸ See Altai, "Mogadishu District Profile", 2015.

⁵⁹ One of the busiest streets in Mogadishu.

⁶⁰ For instance, Digfer Hospital, Mogadishu City Hospital, Deva Turkish Hospital or the Darul Shifa Hospital.

⁶¹ Qualitative assessment, based on KIs with 24 companies in Mogadishu.

Kismayo

Kismayo also presents characteristics of **rapid development** since the departure of AS and the establishment of the IJA in 2013. The port has resumed its activities – and is being rehabilitated by a Turkish company. Stakeholders interviewed in Kismayo reported that diaspora are coming back and investing. Entrepreneurs interviewed in the city were confident: “No company has closed for the last two years,” claimed one individual.

The main sectors of the city’s economy are listed in the table below – based on a qualitative assessment. As in Mogadishu, the construction sector is thriving. A construction firm insists: “A lot of new tenders are advertised weekly.” Actors in the retail sector are also very active, and imports/exports from Dubai are perceived to be on the increase.⁶² Telecommunications companies are settled in the district and connection to the Internet is easier than before. Finally, hotels/restaurants – the most visible and symbolic of businesses – appear to be booming since 2013, with well-known hotels reopening.

Table 17: Most Dynamic Sectors, Kismayo⁶³

Most dynamic sectors, Kismayo	
Construction	+++
Retail (food, clothes, hardware)	+++
Telecommunications (including ISPs)	++
Hotels/restaurants	++
Money transfers	++
Oil stations	+
Electricity	+
Water	+

Stakeholders from the private sectors shared that the least dynamic sectors included fishing, farming and livestock, due to lack of skills, technologies and access:

- **Fishing:** The sector reportedly suffers from a lack of investments and processing mechanisms (conservation).
- **Agriculture:** AS still controls the lands around Kismayo, and businessmen reported recent fightings in the areas around agriculture lands.
- **Livestock:** Used to be a very dynamic industry prior to the civil war, along with associated businesses such as leather. The industry was destroyed during the civil war.

Baidoa

Of the three cities, Baidoa is the one with **the most limited development**. The town has traditionally been at the centre of the sorghum production of the country and its location has made it a strategic trade post for southern Somalia. Other main crops include maize and vegetables. Agriculture and trade

⁶² In the absence of data from IJA, this information could not be verified. However, it contributes to the positive image of the business sector.

⁶³ Qualitative assessment, based on KIs with 28 companies in Kismayo. “+++” refers to a very dynamic sector, “++” means dynamic sector, and “+” means relatively dynamic field.

activities have reportedly resumed, but growth remains fragile due to persistent instability and limited infrastructure. Given its reliance on agriculture and livestock, the region is heavily dependent on rain and revenues can consequently be irregular. Residents also reported difficulties moving merchandise to other parts of the country because AS imposed a tax at makeshift roadblocks on any products that pass along roads they control.

Table 18: Most Dynamic Sectors, Baidoa⁶⁴

Most dynamic sectors, Baidoa	
Construction	+++
Retail (food, clothes, hardware)	+++
Agriculture	+++
Water	++
Telecommunications (including ISPs)	++
Money transfers	++
Electricity	+
Oil stations	+
Livestock	+

Challenges

Challenges to private sector development are numerous, both due to the context in Somalia and the nature of interaction between business actors, as presented in Table 19 below.

Table 19: Obstacles to Private Sector Development

Challenges and obstacles faced by private actors	
Insecurity	<p>Instability and regular bombings constitute a major obstacle to business development. Hotels and restaurants have had to close because of attacks – although many have also shown their resilience after a bombing (al Jazeera, Central and Mala Almukarama hotels in Mogadishu, all reopened after being attacked).⁶⁵</p> <p>Checkpoints and roadblocks by AMISOM or the SNA can paralyse business for a day or more. Moreover, transportation of goods by road is complicated, given that AS maintain checkpoints along the main roads⁶⁶ and collect taxes to allow</p>

⁶⁴ Qualitative assessment, based on KIs with 25 companies in Baidoa. “+++” refers to a very dynamic sector, “++” means dynamic sector, and “+” means relatively dynamic field.

⁶⁵ While resilient, private actors acknowledge that repeated attacks have a serious impact on the revenues of hotels/restaurants – decrease in the number of customers, for instance. One also noted that the practice of targeted political assassinations was affecting the business. He explained: “Whenever politics get dirty, assassinations start and fewer people visit the hotels and the restaurants.”

⁶⁶ AS also sometimes refuse access to trucks with merchandise deemed against Islam, as reported by this telecommunication company in Kismayo: it had to organize air transportation from Mogadishu for its smartphones because AS would confiscate the products.

	trucks and cars to pass. The business community convened that this practice has had a major impact on transportation companies and many have closed because of the difficulty of operating under such conditions.
Clan system and elite capture	Somali businesses tend to be organized along clan lines and some actors reported rivalry/favouritism for resources at the clan level as an obstacle to fair market competition and honest practices. Such behaviours prevail in sectors like electricity, water, telecommunications and trade, with monopolies and cartels that control the market. ⁶⁷ In a recent report (2015), the World Bank warns that, “the absence of appropriate regulations is responsible for the emergence of the anti-competitive behaviour currently hindering the emergence of new Somali enterprises as well as prospects for smaller and medium-sized enterprises.” ⁶⁸
Limited capital	Many companies cannot develop because they lack capital. Domestic funds are limited; and diaspora/foreign investments are only slowly increasing and remain dependent on security and political conditions.
Political instability	<p>Disputes at the FGS and FGS/Federal Member States (FMSs) levels constitute a major source of worry for local and international businessmen. For instance, the majority of companies interviewed in Mogadishu mentioned the impeachment procedure supported by a group of members of Parliament (MPs) against the FGS President as a possible source of instability, and which could negatively impact their activities.</p> <p>Several stakeholders also reported their concern with the elections in 2016 and how the selection process could paralyse the political institutions and destabilize the economy. Some expect that foreign investments will be hampered during this time.</p>
Very expensive energy	The electricity sector is controlled by a cartel, a system inherited from the civil war and privileges gained by former warlords. This results in the sector being highly inefficient and overpriced – the price of electricity in Somalia is among the highest in the world. ⁶⁹
Regulations	The economy is not regulated and where it is, regulations are not enforced. In particular, the government does not deliver certifications that could support the export of Somali products. This has resulted in the low quality of imported products, in particular for drugs.
Trade	<p>Somalia is only the 174th exporter in the world.⁷⁰ It has signed only a few trade agreements and has not joined the World Trade Organization yet.</p> <p>Because of visas, Somali businessmen face difficulties in travelling, which makes it difficult to meet partners and assess the quality of products to be imported (which results in a lack of control over products coming from abroad – drugs, for instance).</p>

⁶⁷ USAID/IBTCI, 2014.

⁶⁸ Ref: <http://bit.ly/1Taevvu>

⁶⁹ USAID/IBTCI, 2014.

⁷⁰ CIA World Fact Book, ref: <http://1.usa.gov/TVIFcf>

No infrastructure	Infrastructure is very poor and means additional obstacles for companies. The head of a company in Kismayo explained, for instance: “The lack of road repairing is a major problem. When you send a truck to the district nearest to you, and it is raining, you may just lose your merchandise because the road is so bad.”
Taxation	Many entrepreneurs also complained about the high level of taxation for companies. Several explained that not all of these “taxes” were legal and some of the taxes only serve as bribes for local officials. FGS, IJA and Interim South West Administration (ISWA) levy their own taxes, and if a company from Kismayo wishes to start activities in Baidoa, it will have to pay ISWA an additional tax. These procedures are also informal; officials may try to collect the same tax numerous times from a company, sometimes as a bribe. ⁷¹
Lack of a Somali currency	Business actors do not trust the Somali shilling and tend to rely on the US dollar instead. Business actors also criticize the National Central Bank for not ensuring the stability of the currency: several entrepreneurs complained about the circulation of fake money and felt that the FGS was not intervening when it should.

Human Resources, Private Sector

The private sector is the largest employer in Somalia and it offers competitive salaries in Mogadishu (USD 400 per month on average). The lack of a sound legal framework for the employment sector means that there are few legal obstacles to recruitment. However, this is counterbalanced by the fact that there are also few safeguards for employees and their rights. More specifically, job security is compromised and potential benefits (such as insurance, sick-leave, etc.) are rare.

Table 20: Average Salaries, Private Sector⁷²

	Mogadishu	Kismayo	Baidoa	Total
Educated youth	USD 400	USD 290	USD 260	USD 315
Uneducated youth	USD 270	USD 180	USD 170	USD 205

4.1.2. PUBLIC SECTOR

The public sector is also emerging, thanks to **functional formal state institutions** for the first time in nearly 20 years. The FGS is presently more structured than the administrations of the FMSs, such as the IJA and the ISWA, which were more recently created and whose development have been hampered by political disputes. Ministries at the FGS report that they employ over 100 staff, against 10 to 50 for public offices in Kismayo and Baidoa. The majority of the public servants interviewed shared optimistic perceptions with regards to the future of the FGS and FMS administrations.

Government representatives report that the Ministries of Finance (MoF) in the three locations have undergone the most rapid expansion – often thanks to the support of donors (like in Kismayo, where the Somalia Stability Fund works with the IJA MoF). Ministries of Health are also receiving significant

⁷¹ In Kismayo, local companies report that they have to pay USD 500 to register with IJA, and then a USD 500 tax every year, regardless of revenue.

⁷² Based on interviews with 77 companies, 24 in Mogadishu, 28 in Kismayo, 25 in Baidoa.

aid from international organizations, and they are expected to grow quickly. In Mogadishu, interviews with the FGS indicate that the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior are well sponsored. Table 21 below presents the budget allocated to the FGS as of 2015, which gives an indication of the larger public expenses at the national level.

Table 21: Budget, FGS 2015⁷³

Budget FGS, 2015	
Office of the Presidency	USD 4,4M
Office of the Parliament/Members of Parliament	USD 14,7M
Office of the Prime Minister	USD 4,3M
Ministry of Finance	USD 5,9M
Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs	USD 3,5M
Ministry of Information	USD 3,4M
Ministry of Education and Higher Education	USD 1,3M
Ministry of Defense	USD 1M
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs	USD 798k
Ministry of Fishery and Marine Resources	USD 790k
Ministry of Health	USD 781k
Ministry of Agriculture	USD 750k
Ministry of Women and Human Right Development	USD 733k
Ministry of Youth and Sport	USD 571k

As illustrated in Table 21 above, some Ministries have a **small budget**, which implies limited growth. Several administrations, such as the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Mining and Industry, and the Ministry of Planning and International Relations in Kismayo, report no progress in their activities and recruitment because they have no funding with which to do so.⁷⁴ **Security** is another challenge and the Ministries of Agriculture in the three cities reported that their scope of work is narrow because AS controls, or has influence over, the rural areas that they need to access. Others, such as the Ministry of Fishery and Marine Resources, explain that they lack **technical skills** and experts to develop policies and implement them. Finally, political instability and rivalry between clans, when not managed, prove problematic and risk paralyzing state institutions.

Human Resources, Public Sector

The public sector is likely to need more staff in the coming years with the expansion of the public sector and efforts to structure it. However, security remains a major concern for civil servants, who represent direct targets for AS. Moreover, compared with the private and aid sectors, the public sector offers lower salaries than private companies and the aid sector – which typically range between

⁷³ From the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Revised Budget of the FGS.

⁷⁴ This issue is critical and could be a source of tensions between the FGS, FMS and the local administrations about which entities collect taxes and which ones are permitted to spend them.

USD 90 and USD 700. In the IJA and ISWA, salaries can vary significantly from one administration to the next because no salary scale has been defined as yet.⁷⁵ Some positions are popular because they are known to allow for a form of diversion – revenue collection at the port, for instance. The best positions are the ones sponsored by international donors because salaries are higher.⁷⁶ Salaries are often paid late, which make positions with the government less attractive.

Table 22: Average Salary, Public Administrations⁷⁷

	FGS	ISWA/IJA
Average salary – educated (BA)	USD 700	USD 330
Average salary – uneducated	USD 200	USD 170

4.1.3. AID SECTOR: LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS

The general perception among NGOs is that **aid is increasing**, mainly due to better security conditions that make it easier for aid organizations to operate. Humanitarian actors report that they are now able to operate in areas where access was previously restricted or forbidden by AS.⁷⁸ According to data collected by the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), the level of aid to Somalia – including development, humanitarian aid and support to peacekeeping forces – in 2015 was USD 696 million, against USD 642 millions in 2014, and is expected to hit USD 685 million in 2016. The SDRF also reports an augmentation by 43 per cent in humanitarian aid in 2015 (USD 253 million in 2014, against USD 364 million in 2015).

Human Resources, Aid Sector

LNGOs surveyed reported an average of 45 staff each, a majority (72%) of whom were **young** (under 30). Recruits were almost always **educated** (89%) and **women** represented a significantly higher share of staff (34%) compared to the private and public sectors. This characteristic is due both to the nature of the programmes implemented (for example, women protection, support to pregnant women), but also to donor requirements in terms of gender parity. Due to the short cycle of humanitarian projects (three months to a year), LNGOs reported a high turnover for non-essential positions. Nearly all of the organizations interviewed expressed their intent to hire more staff, sometimes pending the award of a project.

Table 23 below summarizes the average salary per type of aid actor and demonstrates why the aid sector constitutes an attractive field for young students (cf. 3.4.1): **it pays more and offers pathways for progression**. The table also suggests an internal hierarchy within the aid sector, often mentioned by aid employees and youth, from the UN agencies to international NGOs and local organizations.

⁷⁵ This implies that the salary in these administrations will often depend on which donors or UN agencies support which Ministries.

⁷⁶ However, it also means their contract is short-term – one to three years, depending on the programmes – compared with someone recruited at the Ministry level, who could stay there for life.

⁷⁷ Based on interviews with 15 public offices, see Annex 8.4. The average salary calculated for ISWA and IJA could change in the coming months, with the formalization of salary grids.

⁷⁸ As during the 2011 famine in Somalia. More on obstacles to deliver humanitarian aid under AS in: A. Jackson and A. Aynte, “Al-Shabaab engagement with aid agencies”, 2014, Humanitarian Policy Group, <http://bit.ly/1ZKP9ZM>

Table 23: Average Salary, Aid Sector⁷⁹

Average salary, aid sector	
Local NGOs	
Average salary - youth	USD 580
Average salary - 30+	USD 660
International NGOs	
Entry level	USD 200–300
With experience	USD 900–1,000+
United Nations⁸⁰	
Grade C	USD 800
Grade B	USD 1,200
Grade A	USD 1,800

Security threats against aid actors are not as high as those against civil servants, but NGO workers are still **at risk of being targeted** for working with foreigners, or because criminal groups/AS believe that their employers will pay ransoms for their release. Aid workers also report difficulties working outside of the urban centres due to AS's persistent control over these areas. Lastly, several LNGOs described tensions with central or state government bodies, who would allegedly try to channel funding in their own direction or to obtain bribes in return for granting authorization for projects to be implemented in their area of jurisdiction.

4.2. LABOUR DEMAND

Nearly all of the employers surveyed were keen to hire more staff in the mid-term, from private sector actors to LNGOs anticipating more funding. Their **optimism** has not been translated into immediate waves of recruitment, but still bodes well for the future. Most employers look for staff with **simple skills**, such as business management (accounting in particular), English and basic IT knowledge. Private sector actors believe that **youth are better at meeting their demands** and are more motivated to work, as well as more interested in learning and easier to train on the job. The youth workforce cannot, however, answer **the pressing need for specialized and technical skills**, which hampers the development of more value-added activities.

Box 8: Skills and Attitudes

A preliminary finding with regards to skills in demand is that employers sometimes confuse the concept of “skill” with “attitude”. Several employers explained that they were looking for skills such as “hard work” and “professionalism”. Others shared they wanted candidates with the skill of “working long hours”. This mix-up suggests that **willingness to work and motivation to learn may be as critical a criteria as skills for employers** when looking for new staff.

⁷⁹ Based on interviews with 15 LNGOs and 9 INGOs. See: Annex 8.4.

⁸⁰ Respondents note that UN agencies also offer benefit packages that may include health insurance and paid leaves.

4.2.1. LABOUR DEMAND PRIVATE SECTOR

Interviews with private sector actors and youth reveal **the increasing demand for educated staff**, even for low-level jobs. In a competitive environment, education, and particularly higher levels of education, place job seekers who do not have an education at a disadvantage. This is the case for a good segment of the youth population (and 24% of our sample) who have not had the opportunity to go to school.

“Uneducated people are having a hard time in terms of finding a job because we’re in a world where the educated ones are given the priority. Even for casual work.”

– Female/uneducated job seeker, Kismayo

Uneducated Staff

Table 24 below presents a preliminary mapping of the sectors that tend to be dominated by uneducated staff and the kinds of capacities that employers seek in these sectors. It has been compiled from interviews with companies in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa. The sectors coloured in green represent employers noting that they can easily find staff; sectors coloured in orange represent sectors where employers perceived that they have a difficult time finding staff; and sectors coloured in red represent employers who have a hard time finding staff (high labour demand). The table shows that staff for manual jobs are easy to find – these jobs require strong physical strength but no specific skills – but that finding suitable staff for other sectors that demand specific skills is more challenging. This suggests that the uneducated labour force also tends to be unskilled, which further hampers their employment prospects, and that technical training would be beneficial in increasing the employability of uneducated youth.

Table 24: Uneducated, Private Sector Labour Demand

Skills	Description
Manual jobs (construction, port, airport, etc.)	Positions that only require physical strength. Companies actually favour young candidates because they tend to be stronger. Employers did not report difficulties in finding staff.
Craftsmanship	Welding, masonry, carpentry, furniture-making, restoration of furniture, etc. Companies across sectors indicated that these skills are difficult to find. They lamented that they often recruit candidates who are not qualified and train them on the job – which is time consuming and expensive.
Hospitality (cooking, waiters, etc.)	In high demand with the quick development of hotels and restaurants in the three cities. Firms reported great difficulties in recruiting skilled staff, particularly to meet the high expectations of their customers from the diaspora. They often hire staff from Kenya or neighbouring countries.
Mechanics	Difficulties to find qualified candidates among the younger generations. A company in Kismayo explained: “This is very difficult in the city because there is no school or institute that teaches these subjects. We overcome this problem by hiring older people who have these skills.”
Electricians/plumbers	Basic skills like phone repairs are in demand, but there is a lack of skilled staff to do the job.
Drivers	Basic drivers are available but there are not enough drivers for specialized machines. A construction company in Kismayo reported:

	“Most people know how to drive a regular car, but it’s hard to get a good driver of a manual lorry or a crane. And if they are found, they are paid a lot: they may charge you USD 20 to USD 30 a day.”
Tailoring	Lack of skilled labour, whereas it has potential to be a promising sector, especially for female workers who wish to work from home. ⁸¹

Educated Staff

The tables below present a preliminary mapping of the skills that employers generally seek in educated staff. More specifically, Table 25 maps the skills that employers feel are becoming easier to source – although still challenging. Table 26 presents the skills that employers have difficulty in finding and are in high demand.

Table 25 below demonstrates that the majority of companies have simple requirements with regards to their educated employees: **Understanding of business management, notions of accounting and marketing, speaking English and knowing how to use basic functions on a computer.** Several firms insisted that “customer care service” or “team management” were very important skills for candidates to demonstrate. These skills are critical but they cannot be learnt at university or at a VT institute; they are only acquired with experience, and young graduates are likely to be initially weak in these areas. These initial limitations could be counter-balanced by a stronger command of other skills and additional investments to master them.

Table 25: Educated (1), Private Sector Labour Demand

Skills	Description
Business management	High needs for most firms at different levels depending on the size and sector of activity. The demand seems to be met only partly. A hotel in Kismayo explained, for instance: “Here, in Kismayo, we don’t get people knowledgeable about business management, we always face difficulties with that. [...] As a result, we have to train people on the job, but we don’t get results good enough, that meet international standards.”
Sales and marketing	A large number of companies are involved in trade/retail and need marketing services. Finding candidates with these skills has become easier, but companies still face problems. Businesses in Kismayo and Baidoa sometimes recruit employees from Mogadishu with more experience/a degree in the field.
Accounting	Needed in all companies, especially as the economy grows and becomes more formalized/regulated. Seems to be particularly missing in Kismayo and Baidoa. Companies build the capacity of their staff on the job, but sometimes recruit people from Mogadishu or abroad.

⁸¹ While supporting the development of skills traditionally associated with women (tailoring, cooking, cleaning, etc.) may reinforce gender roles and prejudices, it could also accommodate women, traditions and cultural practices, while allowing female workers to make a living, the starting point of their emancipation.

English	Requirement for a lot of jobs. More common among young generations and in Mogadishu, but still appears to be falling short. As shared by a hotel in Mogadishu: “The ones who speak English, they go to work for INGOs.”
IT/computer	Needed for most positions, and especially for the largest companies. Many urban youth are used to navigating online, but the ones with little education face difficulties.

Moving upscale, **almost none of the specialized or technical skills** necessary to business development are available (as seen in Table 26 below). This constitutes the most crucial problem because it means youth are held back at low to middle management positions. This is also the most delicate issue to address because it requires a long-term investment in students and the education system, along with intensive on-the-job training.

Table 26: Educated (2), Private Sector Labour Demand

Skills	Description
Engineering	High demand due to the dynamism of the construction sector. Those with skills have left the country and there is no national curriculum for this field yet. Companies often recruit engineers from neighbouring countries.
Health	Very limited skills in health institutions, but also for pharmacies. Many hospitals hire doctors from the Middle East or Turkey. A drugstore interviewed in Kismayo explained that they could not find someone with knowledge of medicines and had to hire an individual from Mogadishu. Goes beyond the private sector, also in high demand for public and aid sectors.
Advanced computer	For more advanced activities – Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or system management, for instance – skilled workers are difficult to find. Especially in Kismayo and Baidoa. A Kismayo ISP reported that there are no staff in Kismayo that can set up an Internet broadband system, and so the company had to hire staff from Nairobi; at the same time, it used this opportunity to train the Somali employees.
Agriculture	Need for engineering, farming knowledge (crops, irrigation principles, etc.), but also agro-industry to develop value chains (sesame, banana, etc.).

4.2.2. LABOUR DEMAND PUBLIC SECTOR

The public sector is expected to grow with the development of public offices that will require educated staff.⁸² The government is also expected to further develop its security sector, with efforts to establish a national army and police force. Government officials insisted on the need for technical assistance in

⁸² Although elementary jobs, such as guards, cleaners and drivers, go with the establishment of public offices.

the agriculture sector, but also of veterinaries, doctors, professors and legal advisors. Table 27 below summarizes the needs most commonly voiced by the administration offices interviewed.

Table 27: Public Sector Labour Demand

Skills	Description
Public administration	Each Ministry needs to develop its own administration, which requires skills in public management: accounting, management, information systems, etc. The sector needs to be built from scratch, after over 20 years without a functional state. Experience has increased in the last few years, but still falls short.
Education	Pressing need for teachers at all levels – primary school to university – to rebuild the education sector.
Accounting	Basic skills needed to develop transparent public finances at all levels of administration.
IT	Required for the management of public affairs. Also needed to develop relevant and effective information systems.
Specialized skills (Law, health for instance)	Urgent need for professionals/experts in fields critical to the development of public services.

4.2.3. LABOUR DEMAND AID SECTOR

Demand in the aid sector is based on projects, but INGOs and aid organizations are known to recruit the most educated candidates, usually English speakers. Basic skills often include project management, accounting, or report writing; while projects may require health experts or nutrition specialists. A common trend is for educated Somalis to start working for a LINGO and to then move to an international organization, which offers a better salary and opportunities to travel abroad. INGOs are known to actively recruit Somali diaspora, even from Kenya, because they are often better educated.

4.3. RECRUITMENT PROCESS

While the labour offer does not entirely satisfy the demand for educated youth with business and computer skills and specialized technical expertise, the problem of youth unemployment and underemployment is also attributed to **flaws in the recruitment process**. Many of the job offers are not broadly advertised because employers favour the selection of relatives or clan members over the most skilled candidates. This excludes candidates that do not have the right connections or who come from minority clans and means that well paid positions are often concentrated within a few groups. Women face even more barriers to finding a job, because they are often less skilled and employers are reluctant to hire them.

4.3.1. ADVERTISING VACANT POSITIONS

The security and economic conditions make employers reluctant to publicly advertise job offers, and many go through their relatives and clan elders to select new staff. This system reportedly guarantees that they will only recruit **reliable employees**, and it saves them time. Job seekers are aware of these practices and navigate the job market through their own connections.

Offer of Jobs

Private Sector

CASUAL WORK OFFERS: For low paid jobs with construction, logistics or trade companies, uneducated and unskilled workers go to main streets in the three cities and wait for job offers. Every morning, from 6 a.m. to 8 a.m., casual workers go to Bakara market and wait at Golol Place in Kismayo and Kilo 7 in Baidoa. People line up for positions such as porters and manual workers, usually for USD 1 to USD 5 a day (*al-yawn*, the daily wage). There is often a “leader”, or “gatekeeper”, who manages the recruitment and gets a share of the earnings. Women typically sell tea and food on these streets while men are recruited for physical work.

“I have the names and telephone numbers of some casual workers. When I need them, I call them and the same hour, they work for me. At the end of the day, I pay them.”

– Oil company, Kismayo

Box 9: Porter System in Kismayo

The young unskilled men who work as porters in Kismayo are organized in committees (usually around 50 people per group). As reported by one of them, it is not possible to get a job as a porter without being part of a committee. The heads of the committee interview applicants and check how strong they are before accepting them. If a member wishes to leave the group, because he has found a better position in town, for instance, he would often sell his position or pass it on to a relative. The gatekeepers manage the work of the team, negotiating contracts with the companies at the port, as well as collecting and distributing pay. Porters in Kismayo reported to make around USD 15 a day, and the gatekeeper takes a commission of USD 50.

PERSONAL NETWORKS: Small companies, which are most numerous, do not advertise jobs but rely on relatives, close friends and clan elders to identify candidates. Insecurity and a general distrust of people from a different clan justifies this practice in the eyes of company owners. As explained by a small company in Kismayo: “I don’t advertise job opportunities because I run a small shop. If I need to hire someone, I just go around in the community and I choose the person I prefer. I talk to relatives mainly, because these days, you need somebody you know you can trust.”

This method guarantees that only known and vetted candidates will be recruited, but it also eases the process for companies. It saves them time and does not expose them to the pressure of receiving too many applications. Several firms insisted that releasing public ads could create serious problems for them. One firm in Kismayo shared: “In Somalia, jobs are very limited and if, say, I advertise this vacancy through local radios, it may create issues for you in the community, because everybody wants this job.”

“We don’t do any advertisements because we don’t want to face difficulties with people.”

– Company, Kismayo

Some employers acknowledged that this system does not always lead to the selection of the most qualified staff because their pool of candidates is narrow. It appears particularly detrimental when a firm needs a specific skillset to develop its business and no one in the owner’s close circles is experienced in this field. “It’s not the most effective, and we believe the most effective would be to advertise the positions in public centres, through websites, local radios, so that it is an open process,” confided a firm in Kismayo, which still does not apply this method, in fear of AS.

PUBLIC OFFERS: Larger companies post job offers on their office walls, and the biggest ones also advertise them in the local media. The firms argue this is the most effective and transparent way because everyone becomes aware that there are available positions and they can hope to recruit the best candidates. These companies usually look for specific skills or expertise that they cannot find in their own community.

Public Sector

Methods to release offers for public offices vary based on the location. In Mogadishu, nearly all the representatives interviewed admitted that they never publicly advertise a job due to security concerns. Instead, stakeholders discuss available positions with high-level officials (the Ministry, Deputy Ministries, members of Parliament, etc.) and identify possible candidates through these combined networks. This implies that most job opportunities at FGS ministries are **hidden from candidates without a solid network** (often clan-based).

“We collect résumés from candidates, and then hold official interviews. But the candidates need to have the connection first.”

– Ministry representative, Mogadishu

In Kismayo and Baidoa, all public offices interviewed said they posted job offers in the local media or online news outlets (baidoanews.net or somalijobs.net, for instance), with the view to reaching out to the maximum number of people. They unanimously presented the process as very effective because large numbers of people listen to the local radios and read the local press and become aware of the openings.

Aid Sector

Local and international NGOs advertise positions through the local media and dedicated websites, such as the NGO Consortium website (<http://somaliangoconsortium.org/careers>), Somalia Jobs Relief Web (www.somalijobs.com/reliefweb) and Somali Jobs (www.somalijobs.net). UN jobs are usually advertised on these same websites and on the website of the relevant UN agency. This process aims to be **completely transparent** about what opportunities are available in the sector.

Job Applications


Job seekers reported relying on their **personal networks** to look for a position, which is coherent with the narrative provided by business owners above. As illustrated in Figure 31 below, when looking for a job, 37 per cent talk to a family member who has a job and 34 per cent visit friends and acquaintances. Although large companies and some public offices claimed to publicize their offers in the local media and online, only a minority of respondents mentioned that they relied on the Internet⁸³ (8%) or local media (2% for the radio, 2% for newspapers). This supports the narrative that the job market is essentially based on interpersonal relations and clan network.

“Usually, I visit the elders of my clan and I ask them what is new and if they can refer me to some jobs. Because they are the elders, they have regular meetings with local administrations and aid agencies, so they know more than us whether jobs are coming out.”

– Male returnee, Kismayo

⁸³ An obstacle to looking for offers online may also be computer illiteracy. As explained by an uneducated woman in Kismayo: “I don’t know when the jobs are advertised because I’m not trained to use new technologies. Some people can look online, but I would need to learn how to do it.”

Figure 31: Consult for Job Search



Different Methods for Private and Public Sectors

Young interviewees reported a significant difference in the way they applied for a job in the public versus the private sector: nearly half of the job-seeking youth (49%) who applied for a job with a company engaged first with the owner of the company and would then talk to family members who have a job (28%) and to friends or acquaintances (24%). Only a few would consult clan leaders (8%), whereas the majority of respondents (51%) declared that they would **go to clan elders to find a job with a Ministry**. This description is in line with the employers' description of the job market and shows that young applicants have a good understanding of how the system works.

Box 10: Online Job-seeking Services

In recent years, the aid community has supported the establishment of online job-seeking platforms to facilitate youth access to the job market. Shaqodoon (2010, initially funded by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), <http://www.shaqodoon.org>) and Fursad (2015, supported by the Somalia Stability Fund, <http://fursad.so>) constitute two online platforms that advertise positions for young graduates, with a focus on female job seekers at Fursad. Large companies such as Hormuud and Telesom have been introduced to the service and government offices, and UN agencies have also started using them. Both complement their services with initiatives such as VT, apprenticeships, internships, business grants and mentoring (how to write a résumé, how to engage with an employer, etc.). These two projects contribute to connecting youth to the job market and, in the case of Fursad, they also support the integration of women, traditionally prejudiced against in the job market. The extent to which these websites make a significant difference for job seekers remains to be seen.

4.3.2. SELECTION PROCESS

Interviews with employers revealed **very favourable perceptions of young applicants**; but the preference for people from the same clan and the politicization of recruitment for public sector roles has **biased the selection process**. Only a handful of entrepreneurs shared that they rejected this custom because **it hampered the selection of the most qualified candidates**. Women continuingly suffer from additional difficulties because of widespread prejudices.

Perceptions of Young Applicants

Positive appreciations

The majority of employers in the private, public and aid sectors reported no prejudice against young people and claimed to actually **prefer younger employees**. Interviews with job-seeking services, the CoCs and even the Civil Service Commission confirmed this bias toward hiring young people.

For a number of services (for example, in hotels, construction firms, logistics companies) employers prefer young people because they are stronger, more energetic and more competent at physical tasks.

“We do prefer young people because [...] we need people who are active. The nature of our work requires hiring young candidates.”

– Hotel employee, Mogadishu

Other employers summarized their preference for young staff, citing five main reasons:

- **Motivation to work:** Young employees are perceived as “energetic” (company in Kismayo) and able to work longer hours. According to a LNGO, “their performance is twice as good as the older generations”.
- **Eager to learn and learn faster:** Under 30s are perceived as interested in learning and easier to train.
- **IT skills:** Young people have a clear advantage over older generations. Companies almost unanimously mentioned computer knowledge as a specific asset of the youth workforce.
- **Low salary expectations:** Young people are often less demanding because they have just entered professional life and are not experienced. However, not all employers shared this view and some insisted that educated youth actually salary expectations that are too high.
- **More flexible:** Often because they want to prove themselves.

Perceived youth flaws

Employers also highlighted areas where they saw weaknesses among younger staff. These may not be applicable across the board, but nonetheless capture some of the main points that employers take into account when hiring a candidate under 30:

- **Lack of stability:** Young people are perceived to be constantly looking for better positions and some companies criticized youth for their apparent lack of commitment. As noted by the CoC in Mogadishu: “The weakness of young employees, it’s that [...] they want to change their position at work, or they change their mind about working with you.” Several companies complained that they had hired young staff, invested in training them only for the employee to leave for a better opportunity.
- **Lack of maturity and sense of responsibility:** Some employers reported that young workers easily forgot important information or tasks or got frustrated when they did not achieve what they wanted.
- **Security risk:** This concern was primarily widespread in Mogadishu, with several representatives of private and public sectors sharing that youth were not trustworthy. One government official confided, for instance: “You cannot trust them [the youth] because some may belong to a terrorist group.”
- **Lack of experience:** Although this point was raised, it was only rarely mentioned by employers.

Selection Criteria

On the whole, companies, public offices and NGOs claimed to select their candidates **based on their level of education and experience**. Depending on the nature of the job, the level of experience

mattered more than the degree – for manual jobs like craftsmanship, for instance. For sectors like IT, in the absence of certification, the use of practical exams is required to assess the candidates. Employers also mentioned the need for a **security clearance** before recruiting a candidate. This clearance is not necessarily administered by clan elders but can also be granted by previous employers, co-workers, university lecturers, etc. INGOs insisted on the need to conduct a “background check” before hiring someone.

Clan affiliations

Employers expressed two contradictory views with regards to the clan system and the extent to which it influences their decision to recruit a candidate. Across the three cities, the majority in the private sector explained that they favoured their relatives or clan members for three main reasons:

“The best is my family. Then my clan. Because I trust them.”

– Small company, Kismayo

- **Security guarantee:** Due to years of civil war, current insecurity and distrust between clans, hiring somebody from your clan is as close to a guarantee you can get that this person does not belong to AS. Companies all expressed their concern with being infiltrated by the militant group and being targeted for assassination or a bombing – a testimony to the high level of distrust pervading the Somali society.
- **Guarantee against cheating:** “He/she is under the clan insurance and he/she is well trusted. They cannot cheat on you and steal your money,” argued a company in Kismayo.
- **Family benefits:** So that the earnings stay in the family. “It is important because the person is your relative [...], and he is contributing to the income of the family,” explained a firm in Kismayo.

Some employers also explained that they sought to recruit people from the majority clan because it **helped their business** (see Box 11 below about clan structure in the three cities). In Mogadishu, the CEO of a small company shared that one of the four most important skills for an employee was “to be Hawiye, because he or she can facilitate the business”. Another one in Kismayo said that it satisfied his customers: “If you hire someone from Baidoa [...], the community will not come to your shop for shopping.”

Box 11: Clan Structure

Mogadishu: All the clans of Somalia are represented in Mogadishu, but the city is dominated by the Hawiye, in particular the Habargidir and Abgaal sub-clans. The Hawiye run the largest companies and they manage most of the 17 district administrations in the capital. IDP settlements are organized along clan lines – with most IDPs coming from the Rahanweyn and minority clans.

Kismayo: The Darod clan (Ogaden, Marehan and Harti) currently control the city, which also hosts Hawiye, Rahan and other minority clans. All of them are represented in the IJA Parliament.⁸⁴ Some Hawiye, like the Shekal sub-clan, are becoming more powerful economically, with the development of profitable businesses.

Baidoa: People from all clans live in Baidoa, but the Rahanweyn (especially the Mirifle sub-clan, with the Sideed and Sagaal sub-clans) dominate the city. The Garre and Dabarre sub-clans (Digil of Rahanweyn) also wield significant influence.

⁸⁴ The two clans are almost equally represented at the IJA Parliament: Ogaden have 21 MPs and Marehan have 19 MPs; the President of IJA is Ogaden, but the Vice President is Marehan.

This bias toward people from one specific clan is not specific to private companies and also applies to the public and aid sectors. In government offices, **the 4.5 Formula**⁸⁵ defines the repartition of FGS high-level positions among the clans. It does not directly apply to the lower level jobs, but youth and officials interviewed convened that when a Minister is selected for an office, he or she will usually hire all his/her newly required staff from his/her own clan.

Positions in LNGOs are seen as very desirable and these organizations are **under pressure** from government officials and clan elders to recruit staff from their clans. Several aid workers reported that local elders threatened them to hire from the majority clans.

While this preference for relatives and clan affiliates is widespread, some employers admit that the system is not ideal because **it does not guarantee the recruitment of the most qualified staff**. As summarized by a firm in Kismayo, “It’s ineffective because they [*your relatives or people from your clan*] are not that skilled; and you didn’t select them because of their merit and their capacity, but you put more emphasis on the clan relation. Furthermore, because they’re your relatives, **you cannot fire them easily.**”

ATTEMPT TO BE CLAN NEUTRAL

A minority of companies claimed that they did not rely on their clan to decide who to hire and that they exclusively favoured education/experience to ensure that they select the best candidates. Of those interviewed, they claimed to have faced tremendous pressures from their family and clan members but have stood by their decisions. These companies were typically led by entrepreneurs in a power position (economic, social or political) and who operate in a competitive environment, meaning there is a **need to prove their comparative advantage**, like hotels in Kismayo (see Box 12 below). While this phenomenon is limited, better security conditions may allow more employers to trust candidates from all clans, while increased market competition may pressure companies into selecting the most skilled over the best connected applicants.

“Some may ask you to give them the job, with no regards for their skills. They tell you that we’re relatives, don’t take it away from us [...] We clearly say no, and then it reaches the clan elder and he will come to you and ask, why don’t you hire this person who is your relative. This is the biggest problem.”

– Company, Kismayo

Box 12: Headhunting for Mogadishu Hotels

The hotel sector in Mogadishu is highly competitive and business owners report that it is very difficult to find qualified and trustworthy staff. A businessman at the head of a Mogadishu hotel shared that he does not advertise positions, but he resorts to headhunting to identify the most qualified cooks in other hotels before poaching them. He recounts: “We go to different hotels in the city and we test their food, tea and their service. Then, in the evening, we search for the telephone numbers of the best waiters and cooks in these hotels. We offer them better conditions than what they have now and we hire them away.” This system exclusively relies on skills (while employees are still vetted based on security), and the hotel owner insisted that his priority is to be competitive and deliver better services than his rivals.

“We don’t care about the influence of these agents [clan elders].”

– Hotel in Mogadishu

⁸⁵ The 4.5 Formula ensures the representation of the four main Somali clans (Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Rahaweyn), along with the smaller clans, in the FGS political institutions.

Public Sector: Politicized Process

In Mogadishu, the recruitment process appears to be more politicized. All the representatives interviewed mentioned how important it was to be **recommended by the Minister, the Deputy Minister, or a Member of Parliament**. When asked about the difference with regards to the recruitment process in the public and private sectors, a representative from a Ministry in Mogadishu replied: “The government usually employs people who get recommendations from other government officials. Whereas for the private sector, they specifically look for skills.” Such a gap is common in post-conflict countries with the establishment of an administration that relies on legitimacy other than skills, often inherited from the conflict and a power-sharing agreement. Moving forward, if security improves and the grievances of minority clans are heard, the public sector could further professionalize and move away from present practices.


4.3.3. DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY YOUNG WOMEN

Women experience additional challenges when applying for a job. It takes, on average, two extra months for a woman (8.8 months) to find a job compared to a man (6.7 months). Female workers were not represented in the private sector: In the 77 companies surveyed, women accounted for **11.3 per cent of human resources**, and in Kismayo specifically, that figure drops to 8.3 per cent (see Figure 32 below).

“Women are a disadvantage because the employers think women are weak and can’t produce the same outputs as men.”

– Female IDP in Baidoa


Figure 32: Proportion of Women in Companies Surveyed



Just over half of the women surveyed (57%) reported that they did not face “specific challenges” when applying for a job, meaning that 43 per cent felt that they were at a disadvantage on the job market. Fursad (see Box 10) reports that a number of young female graduates **grow disillusioned** because companies ignore them. As illustrated in Figure 33 below, the main difficulties encountered by women include the **preference of employers for male employees and the lack of family support for women to work outside of the home**.

This is mainly due to the traditional gender roles ascribed to men and women in Somali society. Also, unlike men, women rarely benefit from the encouragement of their clan. In rare cases, companies involved in retail insisted that they preferred to hire women because “they are always so attractive to men, and they welcome them very well in the shop.” None of the women interviewed reported cases of harassment, but it is likely these practices exist and that women have little avenues to report these abuses – while no regulatory framework exists to protect them.

Figure 33: Types of Challenges Experienced by Women



4.4. YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The development of new sectors of activity and new companies could partly resolve the discrepancy between a high labour offer and a labour demand that is presently limited. However, while a majority of young people reported **an interest in starting a business, most claimed that they lack the initial capital required for such a venture**. There are plenty of business opportunities in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, but this interest should not bypass the simple principle that **not everyone can become an entrepreneur**.

4.4.1. INTEREST IN AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP

High Level of Interest

A large majority of youth (67%) expressed an interest in starting a company. Youth in Baidoa (76%) were even more interested than in Kismayo (59%) and Mogadishu (67%), which may be due to higher unemployment in Baidoa⁸⁶ and a more open field for new businesses. Even the most vulnerable youth voiced their interest in starting a company: IDP women in Baidoa all claimed that they would want to open a business in the city (see Box 13 below). Aspiring entrepreneurs explained that they wished to be “free” from a boss, and also to make a lot of money. None of the young entrepreneurs interviewed mentioned rebuilding Somalia as a strategic objective.

The notion of entrepreneurship appears to be commonly accepted, and it is perceived that **anyone, with any background, can launch a company**. A young journalist in Kismayo shared, for instance, that he would like to start a business in cosmetics or electronics. “I’m so interested in joining the business sector. And in the next five years, hopefully, I will be a well-known businessman,” he said. The young man had no background in management but was confident that, with initial capital, it would be easy to make a living.


Opportunities

Given the low level of development in Somalia and the reconstruction dynamic, there exist many **opportunities** for new businesses to be established. When asked about anticipated fields for business development, young respondents provided answers coherent with the basic analysis of the economy

⁸⁶ Cf. 3.2. regarding unemployed youth.

in 4.1. A quarter (25%) mentioned opportunities in wholesale and retail trade, a sector in full development and with pressing needs with regards to basic demands (food, clothes, electronics, etc.). 14 per cent mentioned construction, a sector with huge potential, at least throughout the reconstruction period, but also already highly competitive. 14 per cent talked about the agriculture, livestock and fishing sectors, three areas found to be largely underdeveloped across all three cities and with potential for first market entrants, but they would operate under huge constraints and need to demonstrate their profitability.

Figure 34: Interest in Business Development



Box 13: Entrepreneurship and the Aid Sector

The relationship between entrepreneurship and the aid sector raises an interesting question with regards to the motivations of youth: whether they believe in the narrative of “rebuilding Somalia” or whether this relationship primarily represents an opportunity to make money (although the two objectives are not wholly contradictory).

Entrepreneurs and aid sector: Several young entrepreneurs interviewed in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, especially those involved in logistics and construction sectors, reported counting on the UN and INGOs to further expand their activities. “Next year, I plan to get more contracts from the UN and international NGOs,” claimed a young businessman managing a logistics company in Mogadishu.


LNGOs and entrepreneurship: While the aid sector is not for profit, a number of young people, well educated and with good English skills, have seen it as an opportunity to contribute to the Somali reconstruction project while gaining comfortable revenues. A young man at the head of a LNGO in Mogadishu explained, for instance: “I started this aid organization because I wanted to be free and also have a good salary.”

4.4.2. CONSTRAINTS AND DIFFICULTIES

Access to Capital

Youth described the underdeveloped economy as the main obstacle to starting a company. As illustrated in Figure 35 below, nearly all of the young people (91%) interested in business stated that **funding** hampered their development. Among young entrepreneurs interviewed, those who were able to start a company relied on family money (often from abroad), or savings from working abroad or for an NGO/the UN.

Figure 35: Obstacles to Entrepreneurship



Loans have not been available for a long time because of limited development within the banking sector and the perception that they are against Islam. This dynamic is changing with the establishment of several banks and the development of Islamic finance and micro credit products in Mogadishu.

Difficulties for Youth Entrepreneurs

In addition to the general obstacles hindering private sector development previously mentioned (4.1.1), young entrepreneurs face three additional hurdles listed in the table below.

Table 28: Additional Obstacles to Youth Entrepreneurship

Additional obstacles to youth entrepreneurship	
Business skills	Starting a business requires a good level of applicable knowledge in management and accounting and an understanding as to how the market works. Many young people do not have these skills. Several companies reported witnessing young entrepreneurs fail because they lacked experience and did not develop a comprehensive business plan before starting their activities.
“Clannism”	“People only buy from people who belong to the same clan,” stated a number of companies across the three cities. This could constitute a serious obstacle for entrepreneurs who are not from the dominant clans or who need to reach a critical size and attract clients from different backgrounds to be profitable.
Security	New business not only runs the risk of losing everything in a bombing or an attack, but also the widespread lack of trust in youth may make it more difficult to secure investment.

5. DRIVERS OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AMONGST YOUTH

KEY FINDINGS

- 28.2 per cent of the sample has experienced some form of internal migration in their lives, whether it was forced (IDPs) or voluntary. The main push factors have traditionally been security and drought but they are increasingly related to economic factors (for internal migrants).
 - In terms of irregular migration, while economic factors tend to be the primary drivers of migration for our sample, insecurity is also significant, particularly in the context of AS.
 - Those with middle-level incomes or education are more likely to migrate than those with no education or the unemployed; and those with high levels of education (master's degree) and high earning jobs are unlikely to migrate. This is because poverty or need is often accompanied by a feeling of inequality, or awareness that there is "better" out there, in order to influence a decision to migrate.
 - This implies that as education, income levels and development increase in Somalia, migration is likely to increase until people start to reach high levels of education (master's degrees) or attain high earning occupations (CEOs, government officials).
 - Having a job is not enough: underemployment also has the potential to drive migration. Returnees who do not manage to reintegrate are also likely to consider a repeat migration.
 - Even though the return of the diaspora inspires optimism for the future of the country, it can also push young people to migrate because it provides an example of what one can achieve by spending some time abroad.
 - The choice of destination for aspiring migrants appears to be based on three main criteria: the cost of the trip, the dangers of the journey, and the objective or expected length of the migration. Popular destinations are Europe (via Libya), Gulf countries, neighbouring countries and North America to a lesser extent.
 - The push factors emerge as more influential than pull factors and this is why awareness of the risks of the journey does not tend to deter aspiring migrants that have their heart set on migrating. However, the costs and the risks of the journey discourage some, as do stories of unsuccessful attempts by other Somali migrants.
 - Respondents report a high level of optimism for the future of Somalia, which has the potential to encourage them to stay in the country. However, if these expectations for the future are not fulfilled, some reported that they would leave.
-

This section seeks to answer the question: **Does dissatisfaction with occupation and level of income, along with difficulties to navigate the job market, explain irregular migration amongst youth?** To answer this question, the section first outlines migration profiles in Somalia and demonstrates that migration, whether voluntarily or forcibly, is already a dynamic within Somalia (5.1). It then shifts to the drivers of migration and demonstrates that they are mainly economic but also connected to the pervading insecurity (5.2). The third section (5.3) looks into destinations and associated pull factors; while the last section analyses existing discouraging factors for young aspiring migrants (5.4).

5.1. INTERNAL MOVEMENTS

Internal migration is common in Somalia, especially over the last 20 years of war, drought and economic hardship. **A good proportion of youth surveyed (28.2%) have experienced some form of internal migration in their lives, whether it was voluntary or forced.** The main push factors were traditionally security and drought, in particular in the wake of the 2011 famine.⁸⁷ People moved in the hope of addressing their basic needs: security, access to shelter, food and clean water. Present internal movements follow the same dynamics, but observers and youth themselves note an increasing trend: relocations motivated by purely economic factors, and **the wish to find a better job in one of the main cities**, in a FMS capital, in Mogadishu or up North, in Puntland.


5.1.1. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Estimated at 1.1 million, Somalia's IDP population is the seventh largest in the world,⁸⁸ and UNOCHA designates IDPs as one of the most vulnerable populations in the country (70% are women or children).⁸⁹ IDPs suffer from numerous protection issues, ranging from limited access to basic shelter and amenities to forced evictions.⁹⁰

Push Factors

As illustrated in the figure below, young IDPs in our sample were pushed out of their homes mainly due to two factors: **lack of security**, either in the form of fighting between clans or confrontations between AS and government forces,⁹¹ or **drought**. Figure 36 presents the reasons for which the respondents in our sample felt forced to leave their habitual place of residence.

Figure 36: Push Factors – IDPs



⁸⁷ At least 400,000 IDPs, ref: <http://bit.ly/1M8wzAw>

⁸⁸ Drumtra (2014).

⁸⁹ UNOCHA, "Somalia 2015, Humanitarian Needs Overview", ref: <http://bit.ly/1MGKJtg>

⁹⁰ See Amnesty International, 2013, ref: <http://bit.ly/1MU3wHr>

⁹¹ While open-armed confrontation between clans has become less prominent in recent years, the operations led by AMISOM and the SNA in the South continue to cause many people to leave their homes.

In 2014, approximately 80,000 Somalis fled their homes during the first and second phases of the AMISOM/SNA operations (March and September) – mainly in Hiraan, Bay and Bakool in Shabelle.⁹² It is also estimated that at least 50,000 people fled their homes in 2014 due to natural disasters.⁹³ Forced evictions in Mogadishu have become more common and affected at least 32,500 people in 2014.⁹⁴ Forced evictions occur when IDPs squat in former official buildings or abandoned properties due to a lack of shelter or homes and are then pushed out by authorities. There have been cases of mass eviction when local authorities wish to use the occupied land for other purposes.

Choice of Destination

The IDPs interviewed reported that their decision regarding where to settle was usually based on the following factors:

- **Proximity** and possibility of travelling to destination easily: As reported by an IDP from Kabsuma interviewed in Kismayo: “We chose to come to Kismayo because it was near to us. [...] We could not afford to reach other districts like Mogadishu and Bosaso because they were too far.”
- **Security**: 53 per cent of IDPs reported that this was a decisive criterion because it was often the reason that they uprooted in the first place.
- **Humanitarian aid available**: For 43 per cent of IDPs interviewed, this was critical because it often became the only source of subsistence for families who have lost their assets to conflict or a natural disaster.
- **Family networks** (36%): This provides IDP families with a more stable alternative to settlements.
- **Clan network** (28%): The clan is essential for protection purposes and also helps in finding jobs.
- **Economic prospects**: An IDP from Jilib explained: “We preferred Kismayo because we thought it would be easier to find a job, since it is a large city and a port town.”

Results of Displacement

A vast majority of IDPs interviewed felt that they had gained **security** (86%) through moving and that their access to shelter (62%), WASH (54%), and education (33%) had improved. However, they lamented the loss of being in a place that they knew and where they have family and clan networks. Several expressed the wish to go back to their district where they still had assets in the form of land.

However, in terms of their needs, most IDPs in our sample still saw shelter and access to food, water and health as priorities, as demonstrated in Figure 37 below. This is linked to the fact that resources in IDP settlements in Mogadishu are strained, as are aid resources in Kismayo and Baidoa. Support has come to mean spontaneous food distribution⁹⁵ (in addition to World Food Programme wet feeding centres), some schools and some Mother and Children Health (MCHs) centres operated by NGOs.


⁹² Ref: <http://bit.ly/1CPIYiZ>

⁹³ Caused, for instance, by floods in Baidoa in 2014. Ref: <http://bit.ly/1MccVtE>

⁹⁴ Estimated by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), in 2015. Ref: <http://bit.ly/1CPIYiZ>

⁹⁵ Foundations from the Gulf, such as Zamzam Foundation, are known to distribute food during Ramadan.

Figure 37: Most Pressing Needs – IDPs



Humanitarian actors have repeatedly warned that the circumstances surrounding the dire living conditions found in IDP settlements are severe and that their conditions have not improved over the last 10 years:⁹⁶ There continues to exist no access to justice, gender-based violence,⁹⁷ sexual exploitation,⁹⁸ and mass diversion of humanitarian aid by gatekeepers. IDPs are usually manual labourers, petty traders or are reliant on begging. These forms of livelihood rarely meet their needs, indicating that NGO support is critical for their survival.

5.1.2. INTERNAL MIGRANTS

Although internal migrants are not forced to move (unlike IDPs), their reasons for leaving their place of residence are **often similar to those reported by IDPs**. There is a proportion of this group, however, that moves strictly because of economic factors (often to find a better job). The general trend is for rural youth to move to cities and for youth from FMS capitals to move to Mogadishu.

Push Factors


As illustrated in the figure below, the majority of the internal migrants surveyed (55%) left their place of origin **because of ongoing fighting between AS and the government**. Several explained that they were not strictly forced to leave, but the situation at home was deteriorating and it was their lack of hope in improvement of the security that finally caused them to leave. Three internal migrants shared that AS was holding a blockade around their city after it was cleared by AMISOM/SNA. This resulted in commodities becoming much more expensive, and residents being scared to travel back and forth from town. Another internal migrant, originally from Marka but interviewed in Kismayo, reported a clan conflict between Habar Gidir and Bimal in early 2015, which resulted in violent confrontations that made everyday life in the area challenging. **These migrants did not have to leave, but poor security conditions compelled them to do so.**

⁹⁶ Brookings (2014).

⁹⁷ See, for example, HRW, "Hostages of Gatekeepers, Abuses against Internally Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia", 2014, ref: <http://bit.ly/1W7J8qG>

⁹⁸ Ref: <http://bit.ly/1hXKpha>


Figure 38: Push Factors – Internal Migrants



A fifth of internal migrants (21%) reported leaving their place of residence in order to find a better job. These youth usually came from rural areas or smaller towns and they were attracted to the larger cities by prospects of higher salaries and a more vibrant lifestyle. As presented in the map below, these dynamics usually apply to:

- **Youth from rural areas moving to the main urban centres**, especially to the ports: “I came to this district [Kismayo] looking for a better job. I was living in Jamame and I was so bored because I had been jobless for a long time. I wanted to get a job and manage my own life.”
- **People from Baidoa and Kismayo moving to the capital**, with the perception that the same jobs are paid better in Mogadishu. An uneducated woman in Kismayo claimed: “Mogadishu is the city in Somalia where all the companies are and where the FGS is. Young people flock to Mogadishu to work for the ministries.”
- **Young men and women from Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu travelling North to Puntland**. A young man in Kismayo explained: “In Bosaso, they have many INGOs and the UN is based there, so there must be more jobs;” while another one in Mogadishu said, “Puntland is so quiet and this has created a lot of improvements for the businesses.”

Map 1: Internal Migrations



Since the establishment of the FGS and the return to more peaceful conditions in Mogadishu, a number of Somalilanders, usually well educated, have moved to the capital to benefit from the reconstruction dynamic. Job prospects are limited in Hargeisa and many aspire to work for an aid organization in Mogadishu. Somalilanders are often favoured because of a higher level of education, associated with better infrastructure and a longer lasting stability in Hargeisa. Competition over well-paid positions is sometimes a source of tension with Mogadishu natives, which can add to the dispute between Somaliland and Somalia over the status of the separatist region. Somalilanders interviewed in Mogadishu reported cases of discrimination against them, especially in the public sector.

Choice of Destination

Similar to IDPs, internal migrants selected their destination based mainly on factors such as security (59%) and the availability of humanitarian aid (51%). Other important factors included the existence of family networks (27%), job opportunities (25%) and access to health (25%) and education (24%) services. These results confirm that internal migrants are not only driven by an economic agenda and are dependent on humanitarian aid as well.

Results of Move

The majority of young internal migrants interviewed felt that **they have gained security** (76%), access to education (51%), job opportunities (39%) and access to health services (38%) as a result of their migration. It is of note, however, that 28 per cent reported that they had lost security in their new place of residence. This was particularly the case in Baidoa where respondents appeared to have been affected by the recent fighting between AMISOM/SNA and AS. This is an interesting point to note from the perspective of drivers of irregular migration. More specifically, if young people move to other parts of their country in search of jobs and then find that their security situation has further deteriorated as a result (or that they cannot improve their situation in their home country), this could potentially lead them to consider migrating overseas.

5.2. IRREGULAR MIGRATION

All of the youth interviewed had heard of irregular migration (*tahreeb*), and nearly all of them knew someone who had left Somalia to migrate to another country without the required documentation. Typical destinations for irregular Somali migrants include Europe and the United States (US), but there are also migration routes from Somalia to the Gulf (Yemen, Saudi Arabia) and other African countries (South Africa, Kenya or Ethiopia). **Poor economic conditions** are the primary drivers of irregular migration amongst our sample, but many youth are also pushed out by **instability in the country**.

5.2.1. PROFILES OF ASPIRING MIGRANTS

Demographic Profiles

The typical aspiring migrant in our sample is **a man or a woman⁹⁹ under the age of 25 who lives in Mogadishu**. 47 per cent of the non-migrant interviewees¹⁰⁰ in the capital reported that they have

⁹⁹ Gender was not a significant distinction in the results.

¹⁰⁰ In our sample, non-migrants are respondents who have lived the majority of their life in Mogadishu, Kismayo or Baidoa.

thought about leaving, against 35 per cent in Kismayo and 15 per cent in Baidoa. Among the IDPs and internal migrants, the majority of the respondents in Mogadishu (63%) reported that they are thinking about leaving today, against 28 per cent in Kismayo and 42 per cent in Baidoa. These findings are coherent with earlier results showing that youth from Mogadishu are more skeptical about the possibility of achieving a satisfactory occupation and salary in Somalia (see 3.4.2). Another characteristic of the typical aspiring migrant is that they are **often single**: 41 per cent of single respondents (non-migrants) have thought about leaving, against 25 per cent of the interviewees married with children.

The typical aspiring migrant also **has an intermediary level of education**: Amongst our sample, the respondents with the lowest levels of education (no education) and the respondents with the highest levels of education (master's degree level) were the least likely to express the wish to migrate or to have thought about migrating. The fact that the least educated are less likely to migrate supports previous research that established inequality is more influential than absolute need when deciding to migrate. The theory supposes that an awareness of inequality, or of the fact that there are people or communities that are better off than you, complements poverty in an individual's decision to consider migration. However, it is likely that the least educated in our sample were not exposed to the examples that would create this sense of inequality.¹⁰¹

This idea is further supported by the fact that, in our sample, **students, not the unemployed, displayed the greatest propensity to migrate**: 41 per cent of non-migrants who were students reported that they have thought about leaving, against 27 per cent of unemployed non-migrants.¹⁰² Again, this may be attributed to the fact that students are more likely to have a reference point that creates the feeling of inequality when compared to the unemployed (who are presumably, and most likely, in greater need). Unemployed respondents constituted the second most interested group, followed by people from intermediary professions (secretaries, receptionists, technicians, medical assistants, etc.). Youth with high-level positions (government officials, CEOs of a company) were usually keen on staying in Somalia.

The 'Easterlin paradox' also provides some possible explanation for why those with intermediate levels of education or middle-level incomes are more likely to migrate than those with the lowest levels of income or education. It explains that, while a "snapshot" comparison of individuals shows that people with higher incomes are happier than those with less income, increases in income over time do not appear to raise average levels of happiness.¹⁰³ This also implies that, as education, income levels and development increase in Somalia, migration is also likely to increase until people start to reach high levels of education (master's degrees) or attain high earning occupations (CEOs, government officials). This is also confirmed by a study led by Micheal Clemens in 2014,¹⁰⁴ which found that there is no negative relationship between income and emigrant stock, where income per capita is between USD 600 and USD 7,500 in a given country. Within this range, the relationship between

¹⁰¹ See IOM, "World Migration Report 2013", 2013, page 94.

¹⁰² This interest was less pronounced among IDPs/internal migrants who are students (only 25 out of 58 stated that they would want to leave today), against 20 out of 47 unemployed respondents to this question.

¹⁰³ Easterlin, 1974, cited in IOM, "World Migration Report 2013", 2013, page 93.

¹⁰⁴ In a working paper for the Centre for Global Development in March 2014.

income and migration is positive; the higher people's income becomes, the more migration takes place, until they hit USD 7,500, or upper-middle incomes.¹⁰⁵

Internal Migrants and Aspirations for Migration Abroad

In terms of the IDPs in our sample, they appeared to be quite unlikely to migrate abroad, mainly **because their resources were often scarce and they would not be able to afford the journey.** Additionally, the IDPs interviewed often expressed their skepticism about pursuing another move to an unknown location, even within Somalia. As summarized by an IDP youth in Kismayo: "I hear that there are better job opportunities there [Mogadishu, Bosaso and Galkayo], but what prevents me from going is that I have a large family and I don't have enough money to move. Besides, if I take my family there, I'm very worried I will meet difficulties to find a job again. Therefore, I want to stay in Kismayo, the district I know the best."

By comparison, **many internal migrants reported that their migration had not yielded the results that they were hoping for, and this disappointment led some to consider leaving the country.** Several insisted that finding a job was challenging when you were not native to the area, or that job opportunities were fewer than they expected. A migrant from Sakow District (Middle Juba) thus explained: "Now, I'm nearly jobless. The only work I have is as a porter, and it's only a part time position. [...] This job is very difficult, and we carry heavy stuff. [...] If it becomes possible and if my situation stays the same, I would prefer to go abroad, where I think more jobs are available. I heard Europe and the US are very rich."

It should also be noted that **in many of the interviews, young respondents said they would be interested in migrating, in principle, but they were not actually pursuing this goal** and often mentioned other projects in Somalia (for example, their current job, starting a company). For instance, 40 per cent of the respondents who reported that they were thinking about migrating today also expressed their interest in starting a company. This implies that while the young people in our sample are thinking about migrating, they will stay in Somalia if they find the opportunities that they seek in their home country. Previous research has shown that the decision to migrate is often considered for many years before the journey actually commences. The point at which a migrant finally makes the decision to leave is referred to as **the tipping point**,¹⁰⁶ which usually occurs when the migrant reaches a point where they feel like they have exhausted all possibilities at home and have no option but to leave and try their luck elsewhere.

5.2.2. PUSH FACTORS

Respondents who reported that they have thought about migrating abroad, or are thinking of migrating, were asked why they wanted to go abroad, and their responses are presented in the charts below. Economic factors constitute the primary driver of migration for our sample, but security concerns also emerge as significant.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in RMMS, "What if? Scenarios of Implemented and Enhanced Migration Legislation and Policies in the Horn of Africa and Yemen", 2015.

¹⁰⁶ See Altai Consulting/IOM MENA, "Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots", page 32.

Figure 39: When you Considered Going Abroad, What Made You Want to Leave? – Non Migrants





Figure 40: Why Do You Want to Go Abroad Today? – IDPs & Returnees



Economic Factors

Economic factors emerge as the main driver of migration for youth in our sample. Respondents cited “to find a better job” as the primary reason for which they have considered leaving or are considering leaving today, and “to find a job” and “to make more money” were the third and fourth most commonly cited reasons, respectively. These findings demonstrate that while unemployment is not always the main driver of migration, economic factors generally are.

Find a better job

Of the respondents who reported that they had thought, or are thinking, about going abroad, **when asked why they wanted (or had wanted) to go abroad, nearly half of them stated that it was to find a better job** (cited by 46% of the non-migrants and 42% of the internal migrants/IDPs) and this constituted the most commonly cited answer. Gender was not a significant marker, and these respondents were typically under 25, single and students.¹⁰⁷ This implies that youth currently in school, who have only had part-time jobs at best, were skeptical of the ability of the Somali economy to accommodate their ambitions, when compared with other countries. It also supports the idea that a perception of inequality is significant in the decision to ultimately migrate, as explained in the previous section, which is further supported by the fact that “to find a job” was only the third most commonly reported reason (and came after security concerns).

“I believe I could make more money in these countries [in Europe], since they are more developed and offer a lot of job opportunities.”

– Young respondent in Baidoa

This also demonstrates that being employed does not necessarily prevent young people from migrating. That is, if their current job is not satisfactory in terms of the amount of income they receive or the type of work they are doing (underemployment), they may still have a propensity to migrate. A male returnee explained, for instance, why, after being jailed and expelled from Saudi Arabia, he would be willing to try migrating again to Libya. He is now in Kismayo where he makes USD 80 a month and

¹⁰⁷ Out of the 105 non-migrants who reported that they have thought about migrating, 89 were under 25, 79 were single, and 49 were students.

explained: “I am here now, [...] and the country is better. But jobs are limited; prices are too high; there are no investments, no aid and no government social affairs. [...] If the country remains like this, I may go to another country like Libya.” This example also demonstrates that **returnees who do not manage to reintegrate well enough are also likely to consider a repeat migration** or another migration to a different country.

Find a job

“Finding a job” was the third most commonly reported reason for considering moving abroad, cited by 29 per cent of non-migrants who have thought about migrating and 31 per cent of the internal migrants/IDPs interested in migrating today. These people were usually unemployed or students, and usually under 25 and single.¹⁰⁸ Gender or the level of education did not appear to make a difference. In their case, **unemployment was the key push factor, in particular in Baidoa**, where joblessness is reported to be higher.

“I would consider leaving, because I cannot leave without a job, and the problems in Somalia are endless.”

– Unemployed man in Kismayo

However, it does not necessarily mean that these people will actually leave, because to do so **requires a significant amount of money that they may not be able to amass**. For instance, an unemployed internal migrant interviewed in Baidoa explained that he would want to go to South Africa, where he believes he could make USD 700 a month. Yet, he does not have enough savings and acknowledges he will probably never be able to go. This does, however, further demonstrate that as levels of income and development increase, migration may also increase (as explained in 5.2.1) because individuals that wanted to migrate but could not because of their lack of financial resources may find themselves in a position to finally affect their migration.

Make more money

To “make more money” was the fourth commonly reported reason for considering moving abroad, cited by 19 per cent of non-migrants and 25.5 per cent of the internal migrants/IDPs. It was reported **mainly by young students** who had learnt that salaries are higher in Western countries. Even salaries considered low in the West (USD 1,000 to USD 1,500 a month) represent five to ten times what youth can expect to gain in Somalia and many of them are becoming aware of this through increased access to information and exposure to the West (through, for example, social media, television) and also by witnessing Somali diaspora who return home in a relatively wealthy situation.

Box 15: Departure Motivated by an Unfortunate Investment

A returnee in his late twenties reported how he felt forced into migrating after a poor investment. The man is from Kismayo, where he was managing a small business selling petrol and gas. At 19, he gathered money from his family and decided to buy goats in order to resell them at a good price in Berbera, to be exported to the Gulf. He did not know that Saudi Arabia had banned importations of live animals from Somalia¹⁰⁹ and, once in Berbera, he found that goats he had bought for USD 27 would not sell for more than USD 15. “This made me feel really bad, and I could not go back to my family because they would blame me too much. Therefore, I decided to go to Bosaso and try to migrate. I was hoping to gain back the money lost at the Berbera livestock market and come back,”

¹⁰⁸ Out of the 67 non-migrants who reported that they have thought about migrating and who reported finding a job as the main reason for wanting to leave, 56 are under 25, 51 are single, 15 are unemployed and 26 are students.

¹⁰⁹ Saudi Arabia put a stop to the importation of live animals from Somalia between 2000 and 2009.

he explains. The man left to Saudi Arabia, where he stayed for two years before he got arrested and deported by the Saudi authorities.

Start a business

As explained in a previous section (4.4.2), lack of initial capital constitutes a major hurdle to business creation. Several returnees shared that they went abroad, to Saudi Arabia or South Africa, to make a living, save money and be able to **gather enough capital to start a business** in Somalia. As such, a female returnee interviewed in Baidoa explained that she went to Saudi Arabia to work as a housewife, with the long-term objective of opening a little shop when she returns home. She stayed abroad for two years and went back to open her business in Baidoa.

Insecurity

While insecurity does not emerge as the primary driver of migration, it was still quite significant for our sample:

32 per cent of the non-migrants stated that fights between AS and government forces had made them consider migrating. This was the second most commonly cited reason and was more commonly cited than “to find a job” or “to make more money.” Of note, however, is the fact that “AS control over my place of residence” and “fights between clans and families” were only cited by 1 per cent and 3 per cent of the non-migrants who have considered migrating.

“People have suffered from insecurity since 1991. Stability has improved, but people still have doubts.”

– Head of a company in Kismayo

Also, while a lack of security may not constitute the primary driver of migration, it may be the factor that finally causes a migrant to instigate their journey. When non-migrants who reported that they sometimes think about leaving were asked what factors might cause them to finally do so, or what may be **the tipping point**,¹¹⁰ 27 per cent of them cited a deterioration in security. Even the youth who stated that they have never thought about migrating shared that insecurity would be the one factor that could motivate them to eventually consider leaving.

In qualitative interviews, respondents also mentioned **harassment from government forces** as a form of instability that had the potential to create enough frustration to cause people to consider leaving. That is, police forces of the FGS sometimes arrest young men on suspicions of being linked to AS, and when this occurs, it is not uncommon for bribes to need to be paid for their release (sometimes up to between USD 200 and USD 300). Some respondents also reported that the fear of being recruited by AS causes some young men to leave the country.

“Young men are running away to avoid joining al Shabaab, or the other militias.”

– IDP woman in Kismayo

Insecurity also has indirect effects on the drivers of migration. More specifically, the current levels of insecurity constitute a significant obstacle to business development and young people draw a causal relationship between the limited economic opportunities in the country and the persistent fighting: “It is the insecurity, long lasting in Somalia, that is responsible for so many young men and women remaining jobless and hopeless,” insisted a young man in Baidoa.

¹¹⁰ The decision to migrate is often considered for many years before the journey actually commences. The point at which a migrant finally makes the decision to leave is referred to as “the tipping point”. Altai Consulting/IOM, “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots”, 2015, page 32.

Conflict between clans

Only a few respondents mentioned disputes between clans as a primary factor of migration. However, these tensions are often latent and, if not restrained, they could further jeopardize security conditions, especially with the looming 2016 electoral process:

- **In Mogadishu:** The capital is at the centre of the most acute political and clan-based tensions, such as the recent impeachment attempt supported by a number of members of Parliament opposing the President¹¹¹ or the 2014 political crisis between the President and Prime Minister Sheikh Ahmed.¹¹² Competition over land ownership has also reactivated conflicts between clans, and the control exerted by the Hawiye over the political institutions in Mogadishu is challenged by the other clans.¹¹³
- **In Kismayo:** The Ogaden and the Marehane have been at odds with the establishment of the IJA and power sharing. Distribution of economic resources, such as control over the port, is also a source of tension. The presence of the Hawiye and the pressure to integrate them into the decision-making institutions have added to the complexity of local politics.
- **In Baidoa:** The creation of the South West state has fed serious tensions between two factions within the Digil-Mirifle.¹¹⁴ After months of protracted crises, the ISWA was finally created, but the grievances of the supporters of a state inclusive of other regions were not fully addressed. There is an upcoming election of state representatives, which, if not managed, could revive tensions between sub-clans and reactivate latent sources of conflict.

Somali Diaspora and the Success Narrative

Since 1991, over a million Somalis have left the country and they constitute one of the largest diasporas in the world. The establishment of the FGS and the return to more stable conditions has motivated portions of the Somali diaspora to return home. Returning members of the diaspora tend to invest in the country and also bring with them skills and experiences that allow them to contribute more uniquely to the reconstruction efforts. This has not only contributed to economic growth and job creation but people tend to also feel more optimistic about the future of the country when they see the diaspora returning.

Box 16: Migration for Development in Africa

The MIDA programme is based on the acknowledgement that the Somali diaspora assumes strategic responsibilities with regards to skills transfer and reconstruction, along with influencing policies in their host country. Since 2009, IOM has worked with ministries and agencies across Somalia and Somaliland, and supports the placement of short-term consultants and the capacity building of Somali administrations. IOM works in four main areas: 1) public financial management, transparency and accountability; 2) development planning and aid coordination; 3) public sector

¹¹¹ See: <http://bit.ly/1E6s4Zz>

¹¹² See: <http://bit.ly/1GWZ6qs>

¹¹³ For a more in-depth analysis of conflict dynamics in Mogadishu, see Saferworld, “Mogadishu Rising?”, 2012, ref: <http://bit.ly/1HyQTz4>

¹¹⁴ Some, the “SW6” advocated resurrecting the six-region South West state, initially created in 2002, which covered Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle, along with three other regions currently part of the IJA (Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba). A second group supported the establishment of a South West state confined to the Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions. This faction, “SW3”, received the backing of the international community and the FGS, and ISWA was finally established on these borders.

and parliamentary reform and 4) implementation of good governance standards and quality controls during the political transition in Somalia.

However, even though the return of the diaspora shows a revived trust in the future of the country, employers and youth note that their success still **inspires young people to migrate**. A female IDP interviewed in Kismayo stated: “They [*youth*] see these people who were with them 10 years ago and had nothing, and now they are making good investments and building large houses. It causes young people to start thinking that they should go to Europe as well, make some money, and come back after 10 years.”

Box 17: Business and Political Ambitions of Diaspora

Many Somali diaspora wish to return to reconnect with the country and their culture. Both economic and political objectives motivate a diaspora member’s return. Somalis from abroad want to contribute to the economic reconstruction, but also take advantage of business opportunities in fields with nearly no competitors [*and although other challenges exist*]. Diaspora also share an interest in the establishment of new state institutions and have been closely associated with the political process. Skills in public administration and management, along with expertise in specific fields, are needed to redevelop functioning state institutions.

“I wish to participate in the reconstruction of my country [...] and to take part in my country’s political future by becoming one of the first members of the Galmudug State Parliament.”

– Returnee from the UK

Moreover, as members of the diaspora tend to be more skilled or educated, on average, than Somalis who have never left, they tend to be favoured for positions in INGOs/UN and the government. This creates frustration for non-diaspora members, but also furthers the perception that one will experience a better standard of living if they spend some time abroad, encouraging migration.

This is particularly so with Somalis who were living in the West. They tend to demonstrate a higher education level, be better off economically and hold a foreign passport.¹¹⁵ By comparison, returnees from the Gulf or neighbouring countries are often less educated and unskilled. A returnee to Kismayo from Yemen explained how this can create frustrations for a segment of the returnee population too: “Humanitarian organizations give the priority to applicants who spent time in Western countries, and this demoralizes us [*other returnees*] because we have no chance of getting a job.”

Box 18: Social Media

With the development of Internet access in the main cities, social media has had an increasing influence on urban youth and their perception of life abroad.

ATTRACTION

Pictures that young migrants post on Facebook and other social media platforms give Somali youth at home a flavour of life abroad, but more specifically, a sense of what could be possible for them abroad. This not only contributes to making the idea of migration more

“When people see these pictures, they pack their bag.”

– Young male interviewee, Mog.

¹¹⁵ Which allows them to travel back and forth. Diaspora having settled in the West often come alone, while their children, and sometimes their wife, stay abroad.

appealing but can also help create a perception of inequality that, as previously discussed (see 5.2.1), can be more influential than absolute need in the decision to migrate.

MIGRATION FACILITATOR

Social media has also contributed to lowering the costs of migration and decreased the risk of being pushed back once in a host country. Through Skype conversations and Facebook groups, they facilitate the creation of reliable and up-to-date sources of information about how to leave, which roads to take, and asylum frameworks for those wishing to apply for international protection. Dekker and Engbergsen, who have studied the influence of social media on migration, note that social media “offers a rich source of insider knowledge on migration that is discrete and unofficial. This makes potential migrants ‘streetwise’ with regard to the undertaking of migration.”¹¹⁶

MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH FAMILIES

Finally, the widespread use of social media decreases the costs of leaving: migration no longer means being cutoff from one’s family or home country. Migrants can now remain connected with their relatives – in an urban environment – over Facebook, email, Viber or Skype. McGregor and Siegel also raise an interesting question about the consequences of this relationship: Will it make it easier for migrants to return and reintegrate into their community, given that they have maintained strong ties over the Internet with relatives and friends?


5.3. DESTINATIONS AND PULL FACTORS

The choice of destination for aspiring migrants appears to be based on three main criteria: **the cost of the trip, the dangers of the journey, and the objective or expected length of the migration.** While Europe tends to be the most popular destination, it is also the most expensive to travel to and the journey is the most dangerous because most aspiring migrants must cross the Sahara and then the Mediterranean Sea. The Gulf tends to be most popular for short-term migration and for migrants with limited economic resources (the journey is not as dangerous and it is cheaper). Countries in the Horn of Africa (such as Kenya and Ethiopia) are not very popular because they do not offer the same job opportunities as the others, and also because relations between Somalia and its neighbours are sometimes tense.

¹¹⁶ Dekker, R. & Engbersen G., “How Social Media Transform Migrant Networks and Facilitate Migration”, 2012, page 2. ref: <http://bit.ly/1LoTxqT>

Other researchers, however, warn that social media could have a detrimental impact by easing the recruitment of victims of human trafficking. (E. McGregor & M. Siegel, “Social Media and Migration Research”, 2013, ref: <http://bit.ly/1LoVi7G>)

Figure 41: Easiest Destination to Reach



5.3.1. EUROPE

As illustrated in Figure 41 above, **Europe is perceived as the easiest destination to reach.** This is surprising given the arduous and perilous nature of the journey from East Africa to North Africa (typically Libya) and then to Europe. This includes the crossing of the Sahara; the deplorable conditions for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Libya today (ill-treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, racism, abuse, exploitation);¹¹⁷ and the boat journey across the Mediterranean Sea. Between January and November 2015, there were 3,511 detected migrant deaths at sea in the Mediterranean out of a total of 4,892 migrant deaths worldwide, which makes the Mediterranean the deadliest sea in the world. Moreover, even though the majority of irregular arrivals through the Mediterranean in 2015 arrived in Greece, most of the deaths at sea occurred in the central Mediterranean (2,870) and were attributed to boats that had departed Libya for Italy, which is the main route followed by Somali migrants.¹¹⁸

“I know that migration to Yemen has decreased [because of the war] but to Libya, departures have increased by 100 per cent.”

– Young women in Kismayo

However, it seems that the impression of Europe being the easiest destination to reach is not so much related to the conditions of the journey itself, but rather to the idea that there are minimal controls in Libya as a result of the ongoing political crisis, making it easier to enter Libya irregularly and easier to board a boat to Europe from the Libyan coast. Aspiring migrants did in fact affirm their knowledge of the risks of the journey (see 5.4.2). It is also of note, however, that Libya is no longer considered a desirable destination for aspiring Somali migrants (even though historically it was), which is most likely because of the deplorable conditions for migrants in the country now and that it is mainly seen as a transit country for Europe.

¹¹⁷ For more information, see “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots”, Altai Consulting/IOM 2015; and “Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads” Altai Consulting/UNHCR 2013.

¹¹⁸ All figures current as of 17th November 2015 and sourced from <http://missingmigrants.iom.int>

Pull factors for Europe tend to be as follows:

- **High revenues and a decent job**, often vaguely referred to as “working for a large company”. Most aspiring migrants believe that even if they do not have a very prestigious or high paid job in Europe, even if they manage to save only EUR 200 at the end of the month, this will still go a long way in Somalia.
- The ability to potentially gain a **foreign passport** with time. This idea seems to have been generated by observing Somalis who sought asylum in Europe some years ago and were granted refugee status, which later allowed them to naturalize. It is likely to be fuelled by incorrect assumptions that do not take into account current European migrant policies.
- Robust **welfare and health** systems in European countries.
- High quality **education**, and also the ability to be able to work and study at the same time. For some, the objective is to attend a university that offers a higher quality of education than what would be available in Somalia, whereas for others, the objective is to work and study at the same time (something that some are unable to do in Somalia, which excludes them from being able to study at all).

Interviews revealed a high level of awareness about four European countries in particular: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark. There is a perception that these countries are very welcoming of Somalis, a perception that is most likely fuelled by the fact that there are **large Somali communities already established in these countries**. Other than these four countries, only Germany and Finland were sometimes mentioned, albeit rarely. Italy was also only mentioned as a transit point and where one should avoid being registered.¹¹⁹

5.3.2. GULF COUNTRIES

The journey to the Gulf is less dangerous than the journey to Europe (as well as closer) and consequently cheaper. The countries of the Gulf are perceived to offer **jobs and good salaries** in construction and domestic work, and tend to be seen as places where one can go for a period of time to work and earn money. They are not seen as places where one can study, develop potential, or live a decent lifestyle – unlike Europe. This is partly because of Europe’s human rights record and its treatment of Somali refugees in previous years, and partly because of the perceived difference between Somali diaspora that returned from Europe and Somali diaspora that returned from the Gulf (see section on “Somali Diaspora and the Success Narrative” for more information).

It must also be noted that most Somalis that migrated to the Gulf did so as migrant workers looking for jobs; whereas those that went to Europe also included asylum seekers, some of which were found to be in need of international protection and granted refugee status, which brought with it certain benefits. Thus, the comparison would always tip in favour of Europe; a comparison that is made worse by the very **poor human rights record of Gulf States in relation to migrants and the high levels of documented abuse** (for example, according to the International Trade Union Confederation, up to 2.4 million domestic workers are facing conditions of slavery in the Gulf¹²⁰).

Of the Gulf countries, **Saudi Arabia is perceived to offer the best paid jobs** (according to our sample, USD 400 to USD 600 a month). However, Saudi’s periodic crackdown on undocumented workers in the country means that **detention and deportation** are real risks. Many also report deplorable living conditions that include exploitation, abuse and harassment, among others: “I could not live again in

¹¹⁹ Although vaguely reported, comments by migrants reflected a good understanding of the Dublin Regulation.

¹²⁰ International Trade Union Confederation, “Facilitating Exploitation: A Review of Labour Laws for Migrant Domestic Workers in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries”, 2014.

Saudi Arabia. I was scared every day. No human rights exist there,” recalled a returnee from Saudi Arabia, now living in Kismayo.

5.3.3. AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Several migrants mentioned South Africa and Angola as possible destinations to develop businesses. Ethiopia was never mentioned, and Kenya was rarely described as a desirable destination. Several respondents were aware of recent anti-migrant protests in South Africa and knew of friends who were returning for fear of more violence, which could potentially start to discourage others from moving to South Africa.

In regards to Kenya, although it was rarely mentioned, when it was, it was in the context of the **Dadaab Refugee Camp specifically**. There are currently 462,970 Somali refugees hosted in Kenya and UNHCR Kenya predicts that by the end of 2015, refugees and asylum-seekers from Somalia will represent nearly 70 per cent of those requiring UNHCR assistance in Kenya.¹²¹ In Dadaab, Somali refugees make up 93 per cent of the total camp population.¹²² Our sample mentioned the camp as a destination that would provide them with access to health and education services in a secure environment.

“I want to go to Kenya, to the Dadaab camp where I could have access to an education,” claimed a woman in Kismayo. Such a trend is worrisome because it suggests the voluntary return of refugees to Somalia,¹²³ and efforts towards a sustainable solution for Somali refugees (who represent one of the most protracted refugee communities in the world) is jeopardized by new departures. It also suggests that, despite the improved security and political conditions in Somalia since 2012, some Somalis do not feel that they will be able to access basic services in their own country and consider moving to refugee camps for this purpose.

5.3.4. NORTH AMERICA

Youth were mainly interested in going to the **US**, but several also mentioned Canada as a country that was welcoming to refugees and particularly respectful of human rights. An uneducated woman from Kismayo reviewed why youth were interested in travelling to the US: “You will get full hosting, accommodation, and then you get your papers done, and you receive the citizenship and the passport. You can make up to USD 2,500 a month.” This demonstrates that there are some false perceptions in terms of irregular migration to the US and suggests that some aspiring Somali migrants still expect that they will certainly be eligible for refugee status.

5.4. DISCOURAGING FACTORS

Youth in our sample also identified factors that discourage them from considering to migrate abroad. **The cost of the journey** was the primary discouraging factor, followed by **awareness of the dangers of the journey** (although it had minimal effect in terms of deterring aspiring migrants). **Narratives of unsuccessful migration attempts** also played against the positive perceptions of living abroad, but often to confirm the decisions of youth who have already decided against migrating abroad.

¹²¹ 2015 UNHCR country operations profile for Kenya, ref: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html#KENDA>

¹²² Ref: <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/region.php?id=3&country=110>


¹²³ Sponsored by UNHCR. Returns supported by the Return Consortium, which gather UN agencies and NGOs active in Somalia.

5.4.1. PRICE OF THE JOURNEY

The price of the journey constitutes the main obstacle for aspiring migrants.¹²⁴ As illustrated in Figure 42 below, there is a general agreement that **leaving irregularly is expensive** (90%). A male returnee interviewed in Kismayo explained, for instance, that he worked for several years for a company in Bosaso, making USD 150 a month, before he was able to leave. He was saving USD 80 every month, and when he reached USD 2,000, he left to Yemen and travelled to Saudi Arabia.

This suggests that those who do migrate abroad are probably not the worse off in Somalia and further demonstrates that as levels of income and development increase, migration may also increase (see 5.2.1) because individuals who had previously wanted to migrate but could not, because of their lack of financial resources, may find themselves in a position to finally affect their migration.

Figure 42: Price of the Journey



Interviews with youth in the three cities indicated that Yemen and Kenya are thought to be the cheapest destinations, followed by Saudi Arabia. Libya is perceived as more expensive, while trips involving travel to South Africa (to go to North America through Brazil) and Turkey (to go to Europe through Greece) are the most expensive. Box 19 below provides an approximation of the price of travel per destination, based on interviews with aspiring migrants, returnees, relatives/friends of migrants and two smugglers. These prices are only estimates and may change depending on the conditions (anti-smuggling campaigns may drive the prices up, for instance) and difficulties encountered during the journey (kidnapping in the Sudanese desert may cost USD 500 to USD 2,000 in ransom payments; Libyan militia may also ask up to USD 2,000 to release a relative).

“People choose a country of destination based on their pocket. The ones who are better off go to Europe. The ones from middle class go to South Africa. And the ones from the poor family go to Saudi Arabia.”

– Young man, Kismayo

¹²⁴ When asked about the main factor for staying, 38 per cent of IDPs/internal migrants interested in leaving answered that they did not have enough money. When asked about what could finally make them leave, 35 per cent of the interested non-migrants responded: “If I succeed in saving enough to pay the journey.”

Box 19: Migration Roads and their Price

Interviews with youth across the three cities, of all profiles, education levels and occupations, revealed a high level of awareness about irregular migration routes. Even uneducated women interviewed in IDP settlements in Kismayo knew which countries they would have to travel through to reach Libya. While this does not mean that they are all considering migration, it still reveals that discussions about migrating abroad are widespread and penetrate all levels of Somali society.

The map below summarizes the main migratory routes from South Central Somalia:

- **Gulf countries:** Travel to Bosaso in Puntland and then take a boat to Yemen. From Yemen, many cross to Saudi Arabia irregularly.
- **Horn of Africa:** Borders are porous between Somalia and its neighbours and crossing to Ethiopia or Kenya does not seem difficult – even though control at the borders is increasing.
- **Europe:** Migrants usually go through Ethiopia, Sudan and then Libya;¹²⁵ but some travel to Kenya and Uganda first (often the ones from South Somalia). An alternative route moves from Alexandria (Egypt) to Europe, although movements along this route are limited now.¹²⁶ Those with greater economic resources will attempt to obtain a visa to Turkey (often for medical reasons), and then move to Greece and other EU countries irregularly from there.
- **North America:** A less frequented route (because it is much more expensive) involves travelling to South Africa by road, flying to Brazil and heading North to cross the Mexican border to the US.

Table 29: Prices of Migration

Destination	Price
Gulf	
Yemen	USD 700
Saudi Arabia	USD 1,200 to USD 1,500
Horn of Africa	
Kenya	USD 1,000
Ethiopia	USD 300-USD 400
Europe	
Through Libya	Mogadishu-Libya: USD 1,500 to USD 4,500 + Libya-Italy: USD 1,000-USD 2,000 (depending on the boat)
Through Turkey	USD 7,000

¹²⁵ See “Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads” by Altai Consulting/UNHCR for more information on routes from the Horn of Africa to Libya.

¹²⁶ Although less common, youth report that this road is increasingly popular. Larger boats depart from Alexandria and head to Greece or Italy. The journey is reputed safer because migrants hide in the large ships (often with the complicity of the crew). The risks of kidnapping, harassment or detention by local militia is also lower. However, Egyptian authorities have been detaining anyone attempting to depart Egypt irregularly by land (to Libya) or sea and then deporting them. See “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots” by Altai Consulting/IOM for more information on routes to and through Egypt.

United States/Canada

Through South Africa and
Canada

USD 20,000

Map 2: Migration Roads from South Central



5.4.2. DANGERS OF THE JOURNEY

Many of the interviewees shared that irregular migration routes were too risky: 90 per cent of respondents felt that the journey was either dangerous or very dangerous. Respondents also noted that families were now more reluctant to send their children abroad because they were more aware of the risks of the journey. The least perilous destinations were perceived to be Saudi Arabia and Turkey, whereas the road to Europe through Libya was labelled as the most hazardous.

“This year, when parents realized how risky the travel is, there were fewer to send their children abroad.”

– Young woman, Kismayo

Figure 43: Dangers Associated with the Travel



Young people appeared to be very well informed about the risks of the journey and even uneducated IDP men and women in Baidoa had heard about kidnappings on the way to Libya – through relatives/acquaintances or the radio. Respondents mentioned kidnapping by criminals as the first source of insecurity, followed by deaths at sea and deaths in the desert (risks mentioned by respondents in Table 30 below). Most of the youth not interested in migrating insisted on this high level of risk and claimed to disapprove of the decision of their peers who decided to migrate. “I think it’s wrong because they are taking too many risks and putting their soul in danger,” insisted a young man in Kismayo.

“I believe home is better than getting threatened, arrested and looted in another country.”

– Young woman, Baidoa

Table 30: Risks Associated With Irregular Migration

Awareness about risks associated with irregular migration	
Kidnapping	Primary risk as perceived by youth. Common narrative of young migrants kidnapped in the Sudanese desert, or by Libyan militia groups.
Death in the desert/death at sea	High level of awareness among youth. Radio reports over the year have contributed to a good understanding of the risks associated with crossing the Mediterranean.
Dishonest smugglers	Awareness that smugglers can be dishonest and steal the savings of aspiring migrants.
Forced returns	Many stories of migrants who have been forced to return, from Saudi Arabia (deportation), Kenya (expulsion and sometimes fines), Turkey, ¹²⁷ or returns forced by unfavourable conditions (war in Yemen, violence against migrants in South Africa).
Human trafficking	None of the migrants interviewed mentioned risks of human trafficking. They are aware of cases of kidnapping and rape, but little about labour exploitation, bonded labour or sexual exploitation. This may be an area to consider increasing awareness in .

Although aware of the danger, respondents agreed that this did not stop youth from being willing to migrate. A common perception is that people who leave are so desperate and tired of the situation in Somalia that they would be ready to go through anything to experience a different life. A young woman in Kismayo reported, for instance: “They say between two deaths, they prefer the one that comes and wins me over while I cross [the Mediterranean], while they say that the death in Somalia is endless.”


“Insecurity brought joblessness, and joblessness made them willing to take such risks.”

– Young woman, Kismayo

¹²⁷ Case of a female returnee who spent USD 5,000 to travel to Turkey for health reasons and tried to cross the border to Europe. Turkish authorities arrested her and deported her.

Many of the youth interviewed know how to find a smuggler (*magafe*) and the majority (57%) thought that it was easy to find one. The two smugglers interviewed have well-established offices in Mogadishu and Kismayo, where they regularly host aspiring migrants. *Magafes* typically take care of managing the candidates and help them to organize their trip. They rarely get involved in the logistics in the final destination. Qualitative interviews also confirmed that some smugglers focused on the East Africa route to Libya, whereas others have their connections in the Gulf countries or Southern Africa. For the richest, smugglers arrange the issuance of fake documents, often counterfeit passports from Ethiopia or Kenya. Smuggling networks appear to be prosperous and follow the general trend toward the professionalization of the sector.¹²⁸ The Somali government does very little to curb this business – for lack of regulations and the focus on other security priorities – and smugglers reported facing no constraints in their operations.

Figure 44: Ease of Finding a Smuggler



5.4.3. AWARENESS OF UNSUCCESSFUL MIGRATION ATTEMPTS

“If you leave, you’re only going to make your situation worse,” claimed a young man in Baidoa. Stories of unsuccessful migration attempts were well-known among respondents and proved convincing to a number of youth who discarded the idea of migration as a result. Stories of **not finding jobs** in Kenya and Europe were common and sometimes led to migrants returning home. Several young people also reported stories of Somali migrants returning from Kenya because of the precarious nature of life for migrants there.

Legal insecurity appears as another major obstacle to migration, and several complained about running such risks while in Saudi Arabia and consequently being forced to return. “Why would I want to migrate to Saudi Arabia? You will never get a legal document to work there, and you will always live in the fear of being deported,” argued a young woman interviewed in Baidoa.

5.4.4. OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE

Optimism for the future motivates some youth to stay and **invest in opportunities in Somalia** – and indirectly discourages departures. As illustrated in Figures 45 and 46 below, 63 per cent of youth surveyed stated that the best opportunities were in the country and 66 per cent held positive views on the future of Somalia. This shows that two thirds of respondents saw their future in the country, but also confirms that nearly a third would look for better conditions elsewhere. Echoing the previous categorization (profiles of aspiring migrants, under 5.2.1), interviewees between 14 and 19 appeared

¹²⁸ See UNODC (2011).

more inclined to seek more attractive opportunities abroad (59%), compared to respondents older than 25 (69%) who thought that the best opportunities existed in Somalia.

Figure 45: Best Opportunities





Figure 46: Prospects for the Future



However, if this optimism is not matched by real opportunities, it has the potential to encourage Somalis to reconsider migrating abroad – particularly since 27 per cent of non-migrants who reported sometimes thinking about leaving cited a deterioration in security as the factor that would finally encourage them to do so (see 5.2.2).

“When politics become worse, the hope drops down.”

– Young female interviewee, Kis.

6. CONCLUSION: UNLOCKING SOLUTIONS FOR YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

The relationship between youth, employment and migration is not straightforward, and youth's decision to migrate irregularly needs to be understood as a multi-dimensional process that depends on other factors, such as the perception of life in the West, security conditions, the dangers and costs of irregular migration, and trust in a better future in Somalia.

Interviews with over 1,200 youth have shown that young people in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa were generally not satisfied with their current situation, their level of education, occupation or level of revenue. Nearly 15 per cent of the respondents were without a job and the employed youth often suffered from underemployment. Many of the interviewees wished to work in the aid sector and, on average, they aimed to earn a salary nearly three times as high as what they currently make.

The economies in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa have demonstrated positive development, with the dynamic of reconstruction, investments of the Somali diaspora and foreigners (although limited), the rise of public services, and a shift toward development projects for some donors and UN agencies. Labour demand remains, however, insufficient to meet the youth job needs and recruitment processes sometimes create frustrations for being clan-based or politicized.

Economic factors constitute the key drivers of irregular migration, with youth looking for better job opportunities or to make more money. Those with middle-level incomes or education are more likely to migrate than those with no education or the very poor; and those with high levels of education and high earning jobs are less interested in going abroad without papers. This is because poverty or need is often accompanied by a feeling of inequality, or awareness that there is "better" out there, and this influences the decision to migrate.

Economic drivers do not explain youth's irregular migration alone, and respondents also mentioned insecurity to justify their aspiration to travel abroad. Pervading insecurity affects youth's trust in opportunities in the country and may deter some from investing in Somalia. Interviewees overall shared a high level of optimism in the future, but some reported that they will leave if their expectations are not fulfilled.

The context in South Central remains volatile, and Somali or aid stakeholders have little control over security conditions. The situation has still dramatically improved since 2011; this shift allows more ambitious investments, looking at developing policy frameworks, increasing the level of public services, building infrastructure and supporting long-term programmes with a strong development component.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The FGS has been recently established and its policy framework remains narrow. Youth policy, a strategy for higher education and a wider economic plan are missing, and engaging in these fields with the FGS and the FMSs is central to ensure that economic development is Somali-led and the conditions for economic development are gathered.¹²⁹ A clear government direction is also needed to

¹²⁹ See also recent analysis by the World Bank (2015), ref: <http://bit.ly/1Taevvu>

build trust of young citizens in future prospects in Somalia. This implies progress in the field of governance with clear pathways for political transition and fewer cases of corruption.

Youth Policy

The FGS is still in the design phase of its youth policy and interviews with stakeholders at the FGS Ministry of Youth indicate that, should this policy be adopted, officials would welcome funding and capacity building initiatives to be able to implement the new strategy.

1. Release of the **FGS Youth Policy**, with an emphasis on:
 - The need to involve youth in decision-making processes at the FGS and FMS levels, especially with the regards to the preparation of the 2016 elections. Youth organizations could play a central role to ensure that youth voices are taken into account in the process and in gathering youth support for this high-risk political process.
 - Targeted support for vulnerable youth, IDPs in particular. Ensuring that they have access to basic education would be a priority, to improve their position on the job market.
 - The need to develop cultural venues for youth to entertain and engage in sports. Many respondents complained about the lack of infrastructure for youth, and these grievances could be addressed with the development of cultural centres and sports facilities.
2. **Support to the FGS Youth Ministry**, in the form of funding (to implement the national strategy) and capacity building.
3. **Coordination is needed with FMS Youth Ministries**, to ensure the coherence of a national youth policy and to ensure that the policy is implemented at the state level.

Education Policy

As explained under Section 3, the education sector is not regulated, private institutions flourish without being supervised and there is a gap in specialized or high-level skills.

4. **Development and standardization of the education sector**, starting with primary and secondary schools. This would involve:
 - Definition of a national programme for primary and secondary education, and the harmonization of the education offered in public and private institutions. Given the context in Somalia, it would be particularly important to develop history and civic education curricula to increase awareness about citizenship among Somali youth.
 - Focus on access to education for vulnerable groups: girls, IDPs and very poor households.
 - Training of teachers, as their standards are quite low at the moment. This would also entail securing satisfactory and regular salaries for the teaching staff.
5. **Developing basic literacy courses** could help the youth that have not been able to go to school because the country was at war and/or their family could not afford it. Illiteracy is reported to be a main disadvantage to finding a job (see 4.2) and such a programme would address the main weakness that keeps this group in a cycle of poverty.
6. As for primary and secondary education, supporting the **development of higher education** institutions, but **closely monitoring this expansion**. This would require:
 - National curricula, qualified professors, and government control of higher education in public and private institutions and of the quality of teaching.
 - Short to middle term: ensure that universities prepare youth to play a role in the business sector, with a curriculum in business management that includes courses in sales and marketing, accounting, English and IT.

- In the long term: need for a strategy to establish departments for specialized/high level studies, such as medical studies, engineering, agriculture and fisheries biology, law, veterinary, advanced IT, energy.
7. Continue to support the return of **highly qualified professors from the diaspora** to promote excellence in teaching.
 8. Support **interactions between higher education institutes/universities and the private sector**, which could involve:
 - Collaboration with CoCs to develop business management curricula and strengthen relations between the two fields.
 - Hiring representatives from the business community to deliver practical classes/training in business management, etc.
 - Develop career counselling services for students (for example, career fairs, individual counselling).

Economic Policy

Developing a national strategy for economy in Somalia is a challenge, given the lack of security and limited data available about national economic growth. However, such a policy framework, if realistic, could build trust for youth and investors. It could include objectives such as:

9. **Improved business environment**, to support private sector development and encourage foreign investments.
 - Regulation of the private sector (terms and conditions to create a company, annual taxes, etc.): harmonization between FMSs, transparency with regards to what the tax money is used for.
 - Regulations against unfair competition and engagement with private companies to decrease the price of energy, a key obstacle to the development of economic activities.
 - Kerb corruption and increase accountability for public offers.
10. Need for **infrastructure**, in particular roads. Lack of safe roads remains a key issue that hampers free trade in the country.
11. **Labour regulations**, which could protect employees from abuse by employers, in particular with regards to underemployment and delayed payment of salaries.
12. **Trade framework**, which could include regulations to export products abroad, building the capacity of custom officers and the promotion of Somali products worldwide.

Civil Servants

Lack of transparency in recruitment for public positions, along with clannism and politicization of the process risk hampering the establishment of civil service as a neutral, respected and effective institution. Civil Service Commissions have recently been established in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, but their roles remained to be clarified at the time of the interviews. As part of the increased delivery of public services, a key measure could include:

13. **Fair and transparent recruitment processes** for positions in the public sector, regardless of gender and clan affiliations. While this may be challenging to enforce, it is essential to build support for public services as an institution.

6.2. PRIVATE SECTOR

6.2.1. SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Due to its quick development over the last years, the private sector is the field to most likely recruit young staff in the near future – against the public sector, which is under budget restrictions. Donors and international organizations are focusing more and more on private sector development, in particular value chain development. Increased coordination and strategic investments could further contribute to job creation in Somalia.

Value Chain Development

Donors are shifting from quick impact programmes (for example, VT, small business grant projects) to larger initiatives, with a focus on value chain development as a new and more comprehensive approach. In addition to UN initiatives (ILO and UNDP), two main programmes, presented below, are currently being launched in Somalia: Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia (PIMS) and Growth, Enterprises, Employment and Livelihoods (GEEL).

Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia (PIMS)

PIMS¹³⁰ is a three-year programme (2015–2018) implemented by DAI-UK and funded by Department for International Development (DFID). The programme amounts to GBP 45 million and works in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia. It aims to support inclusive economic growth through private sector development. PIMS relies on the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach,¹³¹ and its objective is to generate net attributable income of GBP 25.5 million for poor producers and entrepreneurs, leverage more than GBP 10 million in additional private sector investment and create over 9,000 long-term jobs, including 4,400 for women.

Somalia Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihoods (GEEL)

GEEL is a five-year programme (2015–2020) implemented by Engility Holdings in Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland, and funded by USAID. This USD 74 million initiative aims to promote inclusive economic growth, enhance business environment through access to finance, policy and regulation support, encourage the creation of new companies, support agricultural value chains, and increase the participation of women and youth in the economy.

14. In order to contribute to this sector, **coordination with implementers** is critical to identify which value chains they are already working on and what other opportunities exist. Such a collaboration would look at:

- **Remaining gaps** in value chain development and opportunities in Somalia. It is possible that existing programs by UNDP/ILO, USAID and DFID already cover existing needs and that IOM efforts should focus on an area that would complement these efforts.
- Main obstacles and lessons learnt from value chain development in South Central.
- Gaps in terms of **national policy or means available to enforce existing regulations**.

Entrepreneurship and Areas of Development

As documented earlier (see: 4.4), access to capital constitutes a major obstacle to enterprise creation. Youth also lack skills in business development and management. A future intervention could support

¹³⁰ Ref: <http://bit.ly/1ImEQLy>

¹³¹ Ref: <http://bit.ly/1LddoVg>

incubation schemes, which would entail initial funding and mentoring, along with regular follow-up throughout the growth of the company. This would involve:

15. **Supporting co-funding mechanisms:** Most of the business grant initiatives do not require a personal investment from the beneficiaries, whereas co-funding – for instance, 50 per cent provided by an aid organization and a 50 per cent contribution from the beneficiaries – could turn support for business creation into a more empowering/responsible process.
 - Distributing a grant to a **group of young entrepreneurs**, instead of one individual, could also be an option to manage risks and ensure a larger initial capital; this would allow for more ambitious projects. A possibility is that this type of project benefits groups constituted based on clan affiliations and the donor/implementer needs to ensure this does not mean some (minority) clans are excluded from the programme.
16. Providing initial support, along with mentoring, **throughout the expansion of the firm.** A common complaint among youth, and a flaw noted by INGOs themselves, is that aid organizations tend to offer business grants and initial support to aspiring entrepreneurs, but rarely follow-up and many of them fail. A more regular monitoring of companies recently created would not only offer avenues to discuss best practices in business management but also help to identify what types of challenges youth typically face and what could be done to address them.
17. Identifying fields that look the most promising today:
 - **Construction** is likely to stay a dynamic sector for the next years, due to the need to rebuild infrastructure, roads, public buildings, etc. While it should slow down in the main cities, the needs for roads, bridges and buildings across the country are considerable and guarantee a sustained level of activity for construction firms.
 - **Logistics**, because Somalia is such a difficult environment to operate in and infrastructure remains limited.
 - **Retail**, because the demand for goods (food, clothes, electronics, etc.) is increasing with increasing revenues.
 - **Hospitality**, with a sustained demand from Somali diaspora and public officials that often gather in hotels and restaurants.
 - **Services for aid organizations**, such as security providers, monitoring and evaluation of programmes, and catering.
 - **Telecommunications** and increased demand for Internet access.
 - **Money transferring**, a dynamic sector that is unlikely to slow down.
18. Supporting investments in sectors that will become promising:
 - **Energy**, starting with renewable energy and oil stations and that could potentially develop further with oil/gas exploitation.
 - **Entertainment**, since this sector is nearly non-existent today while there is a pressing demand from youth and other parts of the society.
 - **Banking sector**, with increasing needs for financial services, loans in particular.
19. Supporting investments in **health and education**, two services that need to be strictly monitored by public offices but will need investments from private actors to answer the demand.

6.2.2. YOUTH PROGRAMMES

Vocational Training

Over the last years, UN agencies and INGOs have commonly relied on VT to support job seekers. The conditions in Somalia made it difficult to develop larger scale programmes, and VT seems to guarantee a quick answer to difficulties faced by uneducated and unskilled youth. Of interest, interviewees expressed a great appetite for VT: 66 per cent of the respondents answered that VT was the best way to make youth more attractive on the job market, which suggests that youth value this type of training to gain new skills. Nearly all of the INGOs interviewed had been involved in VT, and they shared a few points of analysis about this type of project:

- It is difficult to identify which sectors are the most strategic to invest in and there is a risk of saturating the market with the same skills.
 - VT needs to rely on methods that ensure the active participation of learners and are adapted to young people with different backgrounds/who are often illiterate.
 - VT is often focused on basic skills, and some respondents complained that the programmes were not long enough to learn about a practice in depth.
 - There is little coordination between aid organizations, and duplication or overlap of efforts is not uncommon. There is also risk of fraud with the same person taking VT several times to collect per diems.
- 20.** VT can prove **useful for uneducated and unskilled youth** that are often trapped in a poverty cycle and face tremendous challenges to getting a better job than casual labour. Fields such as craftsmanship, hospitality, mechanics and tailoring are in high demand. Local labour assessment should systematically inform the design of a programme.
- 21.** VT projects would benefit from **more systematic monitoring** and follow-up on beneficiaries to identify key challenges trainees face, lessons learnt and best practices.

Cash for Work

Given the pressing need for infrastructure in Somalia (roads, schools, health facilities, etc.), quick impact projects could include building new infrastructure – while developing maintenance systems – and cash for work initiatives for uneducated and unskilled labour.

- 22. Cash for work projects** could benefit uneducated and unskilled youth, associated with **VT/reinforced on-the-job training**, to make sure the beneficiaries learn skills they can reuse when looking for their next job.

Job-seeking Services

Facilitating the linkage between job seekers and employers could support youth with the right skills but few connections. Donors have already funded initiatives such as Fursad and Shaqodoon, and these projects could be further supported by:

- 23. Career fairs and services catering to vulnerable groups:** women (as Fursad already does), IDPs and job seekers with disabilities.

6.3. DECREASING THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH IRREGULAR MIGRATION

As reported in Section 5, the push factors for irregular migration are economic for the most part, but also related to insecurity. A main obstacle to irregular migration is the price of the journey, which implies that economic development could actually trigger more departures.

- 24.** Developing a strategy that targets **the group identified as the most likely to migrate:** this means targeting not necessarily the most vulnerable youth, but the group that makes enough

money to afford the trip, yet not enough to be satisfied with its current situation (see 5.2.1 for more details about the profile of aspiring migrants).

25. Given the low level of development in Somalia, **regular migration schemes** could be established through building the capacity of the Somali government so that officials are in a better position to negotiate with other countries. In the short term, this could involve:
 - **Study abroad programmes**, because the quality of higher education in Somalia is poor and the country could benefit from sending students abroad to become doctors or engineers.
 - **Agreement with Gulf countries** like Saudi Arabia. Many of the Somalis who travel to Saudi Arabia intend to stay there for a few years, save money and come back to invest in a business project. The lack of legal framework currently benefits smugglers and the informal sector in Saudi Arabia, which takes advantage of Somali workers, underpays them and does not comply with Saudi laws. An agreement to allow short-term migrations to the Gulf countries could ensure that Somalis travel there safely and comply with the laws in the host countries.
26. Continued support for the return of **skilled diaspora/Somalis willing to invest in business**. While the return of the diaspora may have some disadvantages and encourage youth to migrate, it still increases the technical capacity in the country (hospitals, engineering, etc.), **contributes to investment** – especially as other foreign investors may still be reluctant to invest in Somalia – and also further **builds trust in the future of the country**.
27. Increase awareness about **human trafficking**, as it appears to be particularly low. IOM Somalia notes the widespread confusion between smuggling and trafficking, which makes it difficult to address the challenges of trafficking. This would require initial research about human trafficking and associated perceptions in Somalia, to tailor public messaging. It could also include more engagement with families and diaspora groups, which often play a central role in funding the journey of a relative.
28. **Continue and extend the support to Somali returnees** to ensure that the factors that made them leave in the first place are addressed. Reception centres for returnees from Kenya and Yemen could be open to returnees from other countries, and the level of support could be better **tailored to the conditions of return**. For instance, most of the returnees from Yemen did not plan their return and many now live in extremely vulnerable conditions in South Central. These cases would need further support to ensure that they are not left without resources. In cases of return, support to the host community is also needed to avoid feeding grievances – and as UNHCR and IOM already promote.

6.4. FUTURE FIELDS OF RESEARCH

The present study raises a number of questions and calls for more in-depth research in a number of key fields:

29. **Rural youth in Somalia:** The focus of this study is urban youth, while the population in Somalia remains rural for the most part (around 60%). Access to rural areas is more complicated for researchers due to pervasive AS influence; but it would be important to understand the situation of youth in the countryside to better address their needs, both in terms of education and livelihood.
30. **Higher education:** Interviews with 14 HE institutes reveal that the sector is undergoing a great expansion, but under narrow monitoring. More in-depth research about existing institutions, programmes available and teachers and opportunities for young graduates could inform future programming to support the development of higher education in Somalia.
31. **Business sector:** Discussions with 75 companies provided evidence of key fields of development for the private sector, along with main challenges faced by firms operating in the country. Extending this research further and analysing in detail each of the points raised by private actors should prove useful in developing a full “doing business” analysis for Somalia.

32. Migration-related research:

- **Human trafficking:** Awareness about trafficking is limited among youth, and it would be useful to study the roots/extent of the issue, along with existing perceptions about this type of crime, in order to develop appropriate programming and messaging.
- **Returnee population:** The returnee population from Kenya, Yemen but also other countries is likely to increase in the next years due to the war in Yemen and the Return Consortium's initiative in Kenya (to facilitate the return of Somali refugees living in Kenya). It will be important to monitor these returns, to understand the difficulties faced by returnees and host communities in order to tailor the programmes that target them.
- **Diaspora:** Updated research about the role of the Somali diaspora at the political, social and economic levels could inform the strategy of programmes like MIDA and help develop programmes to make the contribution of the diaspora even more positive.
- **Family and migration:** Families, in Somalia and abroad, appear to play a key role in youth's decision to migrate, and studying these dynamics in further detail would be key to developing relevant programming/messaging.

ANNEXES

SAMPLING YOUTH SURVEY

As illustrated in Figures 47 and 48 below, 51 per cent of the sample are women and the respondents are split between three main age groups: 1419 (29%), 2025 (43%) and 2630 (28%).

Figure 47: Gender (n=1,200)






Figure 48: Age (n=1,200)



The figure below presents the main occupation of the young respondents in the sample.

Figure 49: Main Occupation (n=1,200)



Figures 50 and 51 below present the family situation of young respondents.

Figure 50: Family Status






Figure 51: Average Size Household



The figure below presents the financial situation of the family of young respondents. On average, a young person supports three people.

Figure 52: Family Financial Situation



EMPLOYER SURVEY

Table 31 below presents the list of companies interviewed across the three locations:

Table 31: List of Companies Interviewed

#	Location	Name	Sector
1	Mogadishu	Qurux Beauty Salon	Service
2	Mogadishu	Deega Waste Management	Service
3	Mogadishu	Buruuk Construction	Construction
4	Mogadishu	Hormuud	Telecommunications
5	Mogadishu	Afro Logistics	Logistics
6	Mogadishu	Hormuud Internet	Telecommunications
7	Mogadishu	Dahabshiil	Banking services
8	Mogadishu	Nabaad Supermarket	Retail
9	Mogadishu	Jubba Express	Banking services
10	Mogadishu	Somali Data Network	Telecommunications
11	Mogadishu	Somalia Management Agro Trade	Trade
12	Mogadishu	Village Restaurant	Hotel/restaurant
13	Mogadishu	Somlogistics	Logistics
14	Mogadishu	Bar Ubah Bakery	Trade
15	Mogadishu	Jubba Airways	Service
16	Mogadishu	Safari Hotel and Restaurant	Hotel/restaurant
17	Mogadishu	Midnimo Supermarket	Retail
18	Mogadishu	East Africa Modern Engineering	Construction
19	Mogadishu	Euro Travel and Tourism	Services
20	Mogadishu	Premier Bank	Banking services

21	Mogadishu	Amana Express	Banking services
22	Mogadishu	Aaran Trading Company	Trade
23	Mogadishu	Somlogistics	Logistics
24	Mogadishu	Kinoor Construction	Construction
25	Mogadishu	Ali Retail Shop	Retail
26	Kismayo	Hawo Yarey Beauty Salon	Service
27	Kismayo	Kaah Mobile Furniture	Retail
28	Kismayo	Kulmi Fishing Cooperative	Retail
29	Kismayo	Benadir Gate Construction	Construction
30	Kismayo	Istarlin Bakery	Retail
31	Kismayo	Walalalha Jamame Company	Construction
32	Kismayo	Mubarak	Retail
33	Kismayo	Hasco Trading	Retail
34	Kismayo	Wamo Electric Power	Electricity
35	Kismayo	Tawakal Electronic Shop	Retail
36	Kismayo	Amal Express Money Transfer	Banking services
37	Kismayo	Masha Allah Hotel	Hotel/restaurant
38	Kismayo	Wayel Construction Company	Construction
39	Kismayo	Hadh Wanag Guest House	Hotel/restaurant
40	Kismayo	Somali Star Cafeteria	Hotel/restaurant
41	Kismayo	Al Rahma Electric Power	Electricity
42	Kismayo	Jubaland Internet Provider	Telecommunications
43	Kismayo	OPEC Oil Company	Oil
44	Kismayo	Sohan Dawo Link	Telecommunications
45	Kismayo	Warsame Trading Store	Retail
46	Kismayo	Hassan Trading Co.	Retail
47	Kismayo	BBC Store	Retail
48	Kismayo	Aw Libah Trading	Retail
49	Kismayo	Hmadi Oil Market	Oil
50	Kismayo	Oil Khadra	Oil
51	Baidoa	Tamaam Workshop for Cars	Service
52	Baidoa	Hormuud	Telecommunications
53	Baidoa	Somtel	Telecommunications

54	Baidoa	Baidoa Farm Factory	Production
55	Baidoa	Ifka Bay Construction	Construction
56	Baidoa	Salama Bank	Banking services
57	Baidoa	Shifo Water Purification	Services
58	Baidoa	Baidoa Electricity Company	Services
59	Baidoa	Bushra Trading and Construction	Construction
60	Baidoa	Wadajir Construction	Construction
61	Baidoa	Isackmode Garage	Services
62	Baidoa	Melbourne Hotel	Hotel/restaurant
63	Baidoa	Nationlink	Telecommunications
64	Baidoa	Skynet Internet Provider	Telecommunications
65	Baidoa	Al Macrifah School	Education
66	Baidoa	Al Muweera Trade	Trade
67	Baidoa	Al Qudus Supermarket	Retail
68	Baidoa	Hayat Medical Centre	Health
69	Baidoa	Hijran General Trading Company	Trade
70	Baidoa	Marian Beauty Salon	Service
71	Baidoa	Ramadan School	Education
72	Baidoa	Salama Restaurant	Hotel/restaurant
73	Baidoa	Tirow Medical Centre	Health
74	Baidoa	Rutga Cilan Sarka Salon	Service
75	Baidoa	Iridimo Beauty Salon	Service

The 15 public offices interviewed throughout this research are listed in Table 32 below:

Table 32: List of Ministries/Departments Interviewed

#	Location	Name Ministries/Departments
1	Mogadishu	FGS Ministry of Agriculture
2	Mogadishu	FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
3	Mogadishu	FGS Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
4	Mogadishu	FGS Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife
5	Mogadishu	Benadir region Administration
6	Kismayo	IJA Ministry of Agriculture
7	Kismayo	IJA Ministry of Mining and Industry

8	Kismayo	IJA Ministry of Planning and International Relations
9	Kismayo	IJA Ministry of Social Affairs
10	Kismayo	IJA Ministry of Transports and Communication
11	Baidoa	District Commissioner Office
12	Baidoa	Immigration Office
13	Baidoa	ISWA Ministry of Economy
14	Baidoa	ISWA Ministry of Education
15	Baidoa	ISWA Ministry of Youth

The table below presents the list of local NGOs interviewed as potential employers for young jobseekers:

Table 33: List of LNGOs Interviewed

#	Location	Name LNGO
1	Mogadishu	Horn of Africa Aid
2	Mogadishu	Kaashif Development Initiatives
3	Mogadishu	RAADE
4	Mogadishu	Northern Frontier Youth League
5	Mogadishu	Peace, Education and Development
6	Kismayo	Juba Foundation
7	Kismayo	Waamo Relief and Rehabilitation Service (WRRS)
8	Kismayo	Solidarity Group of Jubaland
9	Kismayo	Muslim Aid
10	Kismayo	Somali Peace Initiative
11	Baidoa	Deeqroor Medical Initiative
12	Baidoa	GREDO
13	Baidoa	READO
14	Baidoa	SAMA
15	Baidoa	SCEC